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Abstract 
The purpose of EU state aid law is to protect the internal market and prohibit those state 
measures that could possibly distort effective competition. An undertaking, which is granted 
with a selective aid measure may be in more favorable position in comparison to its competitors. 
Therefore, as part of the tool pack of competition law policy, the Commission is in charge of 
making sure national measures granted by the Member States to undertakings are not made in 
selective basis and they comply with common regulation.  
As Article 107(1) TFEU makes no distinction between the type of state measures as such, state 
aid regulation is similarly applicable to any fiscal measure despite of the question of 
competence, including tax regulation. However, rules of international taxation, especially in 
transfer pricing and tax rulings related cases, may create difficult questions on the exact 
application and coherent combination of these two areas. 
This research analyzes the current state aid policy from the transfer pricing point of view by 
going through the recent decisions of the Commission and judgments of General Court if tax 
rulings can be regarded as prohibited state aid, particularly, when applying and interpreting the 
arm’s length principle. The Commission has the burden of proof to point out the existence of 
prohibited aid and the research seeks to explain what the current interpretation standard may be 
for evaluating the correct application of arm’s length principle in the context of EU state aid 
law.  
To fully understand the position for combining state aid law and transfer pricing, basic 
doctrines, related case law and other relevant regulation with respect to both fields of law will 
to be gone through and explained. This includes the evaluation of the legal problem at hand in 
the light of competition law as well international and national tax law, which, in this case, can 
be traced back to OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
There are four major cases on which this report will be primarily focusing – so called tax ruling 
related cases regarding Fiat, Starbucks, Apple and Amazon of which the former two have been 
also reviewed and judged by the General Court of the EU. These cases relate all to individual 
aid measures, that are only designed and agreed between the Member State and undertaking 
through a tax ruling/APA. The primary objective is to give a thorough overview on the current 
legal situation in this regard and possible consequences and developments taking place in the 
future. 
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Tiivistelmä 
EU:n valtiontuki-sääntelyn tarkoituksena on suojella sisämarkkinoita ja kieltää jäsenvaltioiden 
toimenpiteet, jotka saattaisivat vääristää tehokasta kilpailua. Yritys, jolle myönnetään tuki, 
saattaa olla paremmassa asemassa kilpailijoihinsa verrattuna. Sen vuoksi Komissio vastaa 
kilpailulainsäädännön avulla siitä, että jäsenvaltioiden yrityksille myöntämät kansalliset 
tukitoimenpiteet eivät ole valikoivia ja että ne noudattavat yhteistä sääntelyä.  
Koska SEUT 107 artiklan 1 kohdassa ei tehdä eroa valtion tukitoimityppien välillä, valtiontukia 
koskevaa sääntelyä voidaan soveltaa samalla tavoin myös verotuksellisiin toimenpiteisiin, 
vaikka verotus kuuluu jäsenvaltion omaan toimivaltaan. Kansainvälisen verotuksen säännöt, 
erityisesti siirtohinnoittelussa ja veroviranomaisten ennakollisissa päätöksissä (verotuspäätös), 
voivat kuitenkin aiheuttaa vaikeita oikeudellisia kysymyksiä näiden kahden oikeudenalan 
samanaikaisesta soveltamisesta ja yhdistämisestä. 
Tutkielma analysoi nykyistä valtiontukisääntelyä siirtohinnoittelun näkökulmasta arvioimalla 
Komission päätöksiä ja EU:n yleisen tuomioistuimen tuomioita, mikäli verotuspäätöksiä 
voidaan pitää kiellettynä valtiontukena silloin, kun sovelletaan ja tulkitaan 
markkinaehtoperiaatetta. Komissiolla on todistustaakka osoittaa kielletyn valtiontuen 
olemassaolo. Tutkimuksessa pyritäänkin selvittämään, miten todistustaakkaa arvioidaan, kun 
analysoidaan markkinaehtoperiaatetta kielletyn valtiontuen määrittelemisen yhteydessä.  
Tutkimuksessa selitetään siirtohinnoittelun ja valtiontukisääntelyn perusoppeja, asiaan liittyvää 
oikeuskäytäntöä ja muuta sääntelyä. Tämä liittyy käsillä olevan oikeudellisen ongelman 
arviointiin sekä kilpailulainsäädännön että kansainvälinen ja kansallinen verolainsäädännön 
valossa, joka suurelta osin viittaa OECD:n siirtohinnoitteluohjeisiin. 
Tässä tutkimuksessa keskitytään Luxembourgin Fiatille ja Amazonille, Alankomaiden 
Starbucksille ja Irlannin Applelle myöntämiin verotuspäätöksiin. Fiatiin ja Starbucksiin liittyen 
EU:n yleinen tuomioistuin on myös antanut tuomionsa. Nämä tapaukset koskevat kaikki 
siirtohinnoittelun ennakkosopimuksia (APA), jotka Komissio on katsonut valtiontukisääntelyn 
vastaiseksi. Tutkimuksessa perehdytään tapauksien oikeudellisiin ongelmiin ja tavoitteena on 
antaa perusteellinen kuvaus tämänhetkisestä oikeudellisesta tilasta sekä mahdollisista 
seurauksista ja kehityksestä tulevaisuudessa. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Tax competition can be defined as a form of competition where governments try to tempt as 
many tax payers as possible into their jurisdiction by regulatory means to increase their tax 
revenues for fiscal purposes. A well-functioning tax system should also boost the 
competitiveness of the Member State. 1  Reality being more complex as in this example, 
similarly to game theory, the national governments must take the actions of other states also 
into account in their legislative measures. As a result, at least in theory, the taxable income or 
the companies that in the end create the taxable profit should by rational means try to locate 
into a place where it can maximize its gains or minimize its costs. Usually, as paying tax can 
be defined as a cost for an undertaking, such location refers to a situation where tax burden for 
the entity becomes as simple – or even low – as possible. For the government, the state actions 
relate to direct taxation as fiscal measure more closely. On the other hand, the less the tax payer 
pays tax, the lower the tax revenue being created is. Due to the low amount of harmonization 
in direct taxation in the EU, collecting tax revenues falls into the full competence of Member 
States. At a more general level, EU has not much authority in exercising of fiscal policy since 
taxes paid by the individuals and companies are collected by the Member States. EU has tried 
to create some sort of harmonization in this regard but, so far, all attempts have met resistance 
and there is no change in sight.2 It can be concluded that direct taxation is characterized as one 
of the topics that very much divide the opinions on fiscal autonomy and appropriate level of 
harmonized regulation in the EU.  
Transaction flows between the different countries but within the same globally operating group 
of companies, in which the value may factually be created in one place but ends up being taxed 
in another country, makes the allocation of profit for taxation purposes difficult to track for any 
tax authority. It has been estimated that nearly 60% of the world trade is taking place in related 
party transactions. 3  Understandably, considering the sharing of mutual interest between 
companies belonging to the same group, intra-group transactions make – at least in principle – 
                                                 
1 For more information, see Pinto 2003. 
2 For more information, see the Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Rate 
(2016) and Viitala 2017. 
3 Valtioneuvoston kanslian julkaisusarja 17/2014: Siirtohinnoittelu – opas kansainvälistyvälle yritykselle, Team 
Finland. 
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profit shifting from country to another possible. Bearing this in mind, it is no wonder that during 
the last ten years more and more countries are publishing, expanding and redefining their 
transfer pricing regulation to prevent erosion of their tax bases.4 Since it is practically possible 
for integrated companies to price their intra-group transactions, i.e. transfer price, regardless 
of the normal market conditions, the arm’s length principle has been created. This means that 
the undertakings need to show the compliance with this principle for the relevant tax authorities 
regarding their intra-group transactions that an unrelated party in similar circumstances would 
pay the same price in a transaction as the related party does in a controlled transaction for the 
same product or service.  
The intergovernmental organization OECD has established itself as the main and primary 
source relating to interpretation and calculation of the arm’s length level for the transfer price.5 
For the sake of understanding the nature of international taxation, transfer prices are merely 
relevant for those companies having business activities in more than one country. Tax 
authorities are in most cases only interested in cross-border transactions due to that domestic 
transactions do not usually shift taxable profit away. As the Member States have become more 
worried about losing tax revenue, domestic legislations include provisions on how they may 
intervene on possible infringements of arm’s length principle.6 In addition, from multinational 
enterprises’ perspective, considering that the transfer pricing related disputes and litigations 
may turn out to be extremely expensive, time-consuming and all in all burdensome, ensuring 
the correct level of transfer prices beforehand together with the relevant tax authorities would 
seem to make perfect sense for both parties. Therefore, companies and tax authorities may 
negotiate an agreement on the appropriate level of intra-group pricing, that are referred to as 
advance pricing agreements.  
APAs are formal arrangements for the purpose of national tax authorities and MNEs, where the 
parties agree on the MNE’s relevant transfer pricing methods, estimation of its taxable income, 
and other tax payments during a period of time to avoid any possible income tax dispute in the 
future.7 It is designed for resolving transfer pricing disputes that may be more or less open to 
                                                 
4 Raunio - Karjalainen 2018, p. 3. 
5 OECD Guidelines. 
6 The Finnish tax authorities may intervene transfer prices based on Article 31 of Act on Taxation Procedure in 
cases “where conditions are made or imposed between the two associated enterprises in their commercial or 
financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits 
which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, 
have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly”. 
7 https://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/diae2018d4a3.pdf. 
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interpretation of correct price level.8 The power and usefulness of APA is therefore bringing 
legal certainty to the upcoming tax treatment. However, as the tax provisions differ from 
Member State to Member State, corporate income taxation may become very affordable in 
some cases due to, e.g., margin of discretion by the tax authority. Eventually, if the APA holder 
holds clearly deviant treatment from other undertakings, this can be even interpreted as 
advantageous and selective in comparison. 
Are these types of potentially selective agreements completely applicable to the internal 
market? At least the Commission has not settled for a passive role regarding the tax treatment 
of MNEs as this may appear as ‘tendering out’ different tax jurisdictions or purely taking 
advantage of different legislation of the Member States. Despite of the taxation competence 
related question, the Commission has been accusing MNEs for having tax arrangements in 
place confirmed by national tax authorities that violate the state aid regulation. However, these 
actions have also led to accusations of Commission’s wrongful measures and, on the other hand, 
even to a conflict referred to as “tax war” between the EU and the United States. 9  The 
Commission decisions made under state aid law may amount to extensive recoveries for the tax 
payer and therefore draw much public attention in the media. For example, the bill for accused 
unprohibited APA between Ireland and Apple that represented the amount of aid for Apple in 
Ireland between 2004-2013 and was, thus, deemed to be recovered by Ireland amounted to over 
EUR 13,0 billion. 
By taking the competition law measures against the tax decisions, one could argue that the 
Commission is trying to further extend its competence to direct taxation. On the other hand, EU 
has the authority to protect the fair competition with two general objectives: (1) deal with the 
problems and collisions that may take place when different undertakings are operating in the 
same markets and (2) to establish a well-functioning single market in the EU.10 The Member 
States have given away their competence for harmonizing regulation whereas state aid law has 
been designed to make sure unfair and unequal conditions would not take place to pursue for 
more innovation, shared standards as well as gain for small European businesses and 
companies.11 Indeed, EU state aid policy is in the very core of the objectives of establishing an 
internal market. The purpose of these rules is to prevent companies to receive advantageous 
                                                 
8 https://www.vero.fi/en/businesses-and-corporations/about-corporate-taxes/transfer_pricing/guidance-and-
procedures/advance-pricing-agreement. 
9 Lang – Cottani – Petruzzi – Storck 2019, p. 506 and Lowe 2016, p. 1037, 1038. 
10 Brankin 2013, p. 1 and 2. 
11 https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/competition_en. 
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and selective gains over other companies and it is ultimately defined in the Article 107(1) 
TFEU. The main focus in the analysis must be given whether advantage in whatever form 
conferred on a selective basis to undertakings by national public authorities exists, which would 
hinder competition and trade between Member States. APAs or tax rulings could potentially 
fulfill the requirements listed in the Article 107(1) TFEU in certain circumstances and the 
Commission’s record is rather impressive in this field: Since 2014, eight final decisions have 
been given on prohibited tax rulings so far and three investigations are currently ongoing.12 The 
MNEs that have been targeted by the Commission include inter alia Apple, Fiat, Starbucks and 
McDonald’s. General Court has ruled in favor and against Commission’s results in its 
investigations, although we are still waiting for the CJEU’s view on the matter. All in all, the 
functioning of the internal market is very much dependent on sufficient competition regulation 
but, yet, we may also come across with problems relating to determining concepts unfair or 
unequal treatment.  
1.2 Scope of the research and limitations 
The scope of this research is to analyze the state aid policy from the transfer pricing point of 
view by going through the decisions of the Commission and judgments of General Court as 
whether APAs can be regarded as prohibited state aid particularly when applying and 
interpreting the arm’s length principle. In order to fully understand the combination of state aid 
law and transfer pricing, basic doctrines, related case law and questions with respect to 
international taxation as well as concept of state aid regulation need to be gone through and 
understood. Therefore, the framework for legal assessment as well as the applicable sources for 
transfer pricing will be explained in this research, primarily focusing on the developments, 
trends and current status of state aid regulation. At the end, these two segments sought to be 
considered and analyzed together in order to review the case law regarding prohibited tax 
rulings. 
The Commission has the burden of proof to point out the existence of prohibited aid and the 
analysis seeks to explain what the current interpretation standard is for evaluating arm’s length 
principle in the context of EU state aid law and how much margin of discretion is left for 
Commission in this task that will be eventually reviewed by the Court. For example, how might 
a deviation from arm’s length principle in the tax ruling constitute a selective advantage for 
certain undertaking. In this context, OECD guidelines are the primary source for the evaluation. 
                                                 
12 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/tax_rulings/index_en.html. 
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The General Court’s judgments and Commission’s recent decisions on state aid will also be 
analyzed when seeking to evaluate the selective and advantageous nature of an APA. Current 
existing case law, legal literature as well as opinions of the legal scholars and academics will 
support the findings presented in this report. As the compliance of the arm’s length principle 
between Member State’s legislation and EU state aid regulation may differ, the report also 
discusses the topic if we should aim to uniform and systematic application of arm’s length 
principle in this field for maintaining legal certainty.  
After the arm’s length principle and its status has been discussed, its possible consequences and 
result of actions will be analyzed. The framework for this analysis needs to be set in the light 
of what the actual and aim of the EU state aid regulation is and when is the deviation from 
arm’s length principle violating the objectives given for the single market as selective 
advantage, which may result to recovery of aid from the tax payer. As there are no judgments 
given by the CJEU on the application of Article 107(1) TFEU regarding advance pricing 
agreements as prohibited state aid, the primary source of case law will relate to Commission’s 
and General Court’s interpretation on the matter. However, some CJEU case law related to 
direct taxation may also bring help to interpretation on how should the APAs be evaluated in 
front of the CJEU. Additionally, there are number of cases dealing with state aid that may 
further be interpreted in the light of taxation. Many academic articles discussing the topic and 
other official EU sources offer relatively good amount of views from both critical and 
supportive stand.  
There are four major cases that this report will be focusing on – the tax ruling related cases Fiat, 
Starbucks, Apple and Amazon from which the former two have been also reviewed and judged 
by the General Court.13 These cases relate all to individual aid measures, in other words, agreed 
between the Member State and undertaking through a tax ruling. Other similar cases, such as 
the Excess Profit exemption in Belgium and UK tax scheme for multinationals cases, are not 
APA related but rather so-called schemes, dealing with the actual tax legislation of the Member 
State.14 Further, McDonald’s did not include prohibited aid and transfer pricing assessment 
with regard to interpretation of arm’s length principle were not discussed in the Commission’s 
decision as well as, in ENGIE, the case regarded tax technical question instead of application 
                                                 
13 See T-760/15 Netherlands v European Commission (2019); Joined cases T‑755/15 and T-759/15 Luxembourg 
v European Commission (2019); C(2014) 7156 State Aid SA.38944 2014/C alleged aid to Amazon by way of a 
tax ruling (2014) and C(2016) 5605 State Aid SA.38373 2014/C implemented by Ireland to Apple (2016). 
14 C(2015) 9837: The excess profit exemption State Aid Scheme implemented by Belgium and C(2019) 2526 UK 
tax scheme for multinationals. 
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of transfer pricing methods and arm’s length principle.15 Therefore, these two decisions are 
excluded from the analysis. As this report is concentrating on application of arm’s length 
principle and transfer pricing related questions, the exclusion of above-mentioned cases can be 
deemed to be reasonable and in accordance with the objective of the research. 
1.3 Research questions and method 
Research questions relate to the understanding of the current approach in the EU state aid 
regulation towards direct taxation measures and evaluation of arm’s length principle as part of 
transfer pricing assessment therein. As for the burden of proof, the Commission needs to 
indicate the existence of selective advantage. The research question aims also to analyze when 
it may be considered sufficient amount of proof from transfer pricing point of view in order for 
the selective advantage to exist. Since the objective of EU competition law in general is to 
maintain existence of fair competition in the internal market, the research tries to clarify why 
and how APAs may trigger doubts from the Commission’s point of view as being prohibited 
aid and underline the possible issues the regulators and companies may face due to this 
approach. This can be done by analyzing the status of arm’s length principle. At the same time, 
the analysis evaluates the amount and intensity of review required to conduct by the Court in 
the light of maintaining objectiveness of the review. 
Due to the heated debate ongoing between different interest parties, from the tax payers’ point 
of view, the aim is also to try to understand the framework and different circumstances that one 
should take carefully into account while considering negotiations of an APA with the tax 
authorities. Whatever stand is taken towards arm’s length principle and evaluation of APAs in 
the state aid context, this will have far-reaching effects in the internal market, thus, political 
interests around the measures, regulative outcomes and consequences of such application and 
interpretation are also being discussed. To conclude, my research questions can therefore be 
seen as twofold as follows: 
1) What is the primary status of arm’s length principle in EU state aid related assessment 
in the case of tax rulings? 
                                                 
15 C(2015) 8343 State Aid alleged aid to McDonald´s, 3 December 2015 and C(2018) 3839 State aid implemented 
by Luxembourg in favour of ENGIE. 
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2) What is the level of burden of proof for the Commission to show the existence of 
selective advantage from transfer pricing point of view in the framework of the Court’s 
review? 
As pointed out in the legal literature, the use of legal dogmatic method is generally acceptable 
in the field of tax related legal debate and, therefore, it is reasonable to trust the basis of the 
research on this method.16  The application may also be expanded to the field of EU and 
competition law and therefore the legal tradition speaks in favor of use of this alternative.17 The 
method may be used to interpret and systematize the current state of law and, in this function, 
give further guidance on its understanding in interpretation process, e.g., for the judges dealing 
with related cases.18 Taking the nature of taxation as a balance between the interests of common 
good and tax payer, the analysis will be conducted on the neutral basis considering legal and 
reasonable arguments from both sides. From this point of view, the objective is to clarify the 
existing situation of regulation (de lege lata), possible upcoming challenges and changes for 
parties involved (de lege ferenda) as well as to bring forth the potential objectives behind 
actions, which also advocates the use of legal domestic method in this report.  
1.4 Structure of the report 
Firstly, the legal framework of EU state aid regime will be gone through to fully understand the 
full concept of regulation. Articles 107 and 108 TFEU are the treaty-based fundamental sources 
for the regulative assessment, but there are also procedural provisions that give further the 
guidance on the state aid process. Case law has also left its mark on the assessment. In case 
Articles 107 and 108 TFEU have been violated, the Member State needs to recover the amount 
of prohibited aid from the undertaking for which it was granted. It is good to remember that the 
Commission is challenging the Member State measure and not the actions of the undertaking, 
which can be defined as an interest party to the case at hand. After this part, the basis of transfer 
pricing regulation will explain the nature of international taxation and cross-border intra-group 
transactions. In general, transfer pricing assessment is based on OECD Guidelines even though 
this is a soft law instrument. Usually, however, most of the national tax authorities have agreed 
on the use as the primary reference in cross-border taxation matters. Arm’s length principle 
forms the fundamental framework for the assessment of acceptability for intra-group 
transactions and there are many methods for the actual determination in practice. Additionally, 
                                                 
16 Myrsky – Ossa 2008, p. 28. 
17 Myrsky 2009, p. 60 and 65; Myrsky – Ossa 2008, p. 28. 
18 Tuori 2000, p. 302 and Aarnio 1998, p. 989–990. 
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APA as an instrument for tax purposes will be explain. APA itself is not illegal but an agreement 
bringing legal certainty for undertakings and tax authorities for corporate income taxation for 
future years. 
Thirdly, after the basis of state aid and transfer pricing regulation have been analyzed, the 
related case law combining and dealing with both will be introduced. APAs have been 
construed to fulfill the criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU but the assessment of selectivity may 
generate further questions on its suitable tax related assessment. At this point, the facts indicate 
how has the arm’s length principle been brought by the Commission and further accepted by 
the General Court to state aid related assessment to measure selectiveness. The selectivity has 
been tested under the so called three-step test that underlines the difference from what could be 
regarded as normal taxation for other companies in a similar position. In case the Commission 
is capable of indicating that APA has violated the arm’s length principle, undue advantage has 
been granted to the undertaking and thus corresponding amount needs to be recovered by the 
Member State. This approach with its conclusion has nevertheless been challenged both by the 
Member States and recipient of potential aid. Since the OECD Guidelines offers the tool to 
measure the amount of aid granted, the Commission has trusted its assessment ultimately on 
the application of ‘universal’ OECD based transfer pricing methods. 
As the measures have raised a lot of questions by the interest parties, fourthly, the report will 
discuss the assessment procedure, difficulties in the determination of selectiveness and possible 
consequences. The discussion here passes through tax and fiscal policy in order for the reader 
to understand the argumentation and motives behind the parties involved. Also, this includes 
features of economic analysis considering the question of fiscal autonomy of the Member 
States. The related analysis introduces developments and future trends of international taxation 
and transfer pricing and systematizes how these have had an effect on the underlying cases in 
the light of EU state aid policy. With respect to burden of proof and intensity of the review, 
General Court rejected Commission’s reasoning in Starbucks as it failed to indicate how is the 
APA constitution selective advantage but, in Fiat, ruled in favor of the Commission. It is worth 
questioning to what extent possible grounds for the acceptable amount of proof for selective 
advantage may be interpreted in different ways. It seems also that arm’s length principle is most 
certainly be moving from soft law to hard law in EU context – however not only from taxation 
point of view but also in state aid related assessment.  
The conclusions drawn indicate that there may still be some unanswered questions and caps in 
the related judgments. Even though the state aid regulation as such acknowledges the 
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intervention on unequal tax treatment of certain arrangements by utilizing the arm’s length 
principle as built-in mechanism for EU law within Article 107(1) TFEU, the discussed approach 
would nonetheless leave unclear when is the burden of proof sufficiently fulfilled regarding the 
transfer pricing assessment of the content of tax ruling. However, only if the Commission can 
show the existence of no other than fundamental breach of arm’s length principle, the Court 
may accept the measure as prohibited state aid after the review. Above all, existence of selective 
treatment may face difficulties in argumentation both from tax theoretical point of view due to 
the abstract nature of transfer pricing as well as, with respect to state aid regulation, analyzing 
non-integrated and integrated undertakings in a similar factual position for comparison 
purposes. Even though the prevention of aggressive tax planning can be regarded as a desirable 
objective, it is not necessarily state aid regulation that should be the tool for it. Considering the 
number of alternative conclusions and opinions, there may be a risk of putting too much 
administrative pressure on the Member States concerning the evaluation of the transfer pricing 
assessment in the tax ruling, not only as a domestic tax issue but also in the context of state aid 
policy and fair competition. 
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2. EU state aid law 
2.1 Basis of the substantive regulation 
The main objective of the EU internal market regulation is to maintain an equal market 
conditions for every operator in each form of competition, including state aid.19 According to 
the Article 3(1) TFEU, the EU has exclusive competence in the establishing of the competition 
rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market and the articles of action from 101 to 
109 TFEU include the valid and applicable basis and framework for substantive regulation on 
competition within the internal market. As the rules aim to prevent the harmful conduct by the 
undertakings, some of the regulation is equally applicable to Member States as well. In this 
context, in addition to anti-competitive behavior of the operators themselves, if any Member 
State granted subsidies or supported only particular competitors, this would lead to asymmetric 
and favoring positions of certain undertakings and, thus, possible welfare losses and unequal 
treatment.20 In practice, it is the Member State granting the subsidy and the violating party. The 
EU state aid regulation has its foundation in Articles 107 and 108 TFEU and, according to the 
former one:  
“Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, 
in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal 
market.” 
Therefore, the Article 107(1) TFEU requires four criteria to be fulfilled before aid granted by 
the state would be interpreted as prohibited state measure and these are also all cumulative in 
nature:  
1. Measure needs to be advantageous for the undertaking; 
2. It needs to be made on a selective basis; 
3. It has been granted by the state or state resources; and 
4. It must distort or threaten to distort competition and hinder intra-community trade. 
Even though the wording in the Article 107 TFEU itself does not define precisely, which 
measures are considered as aid, this division of four different criteria is applied by the CJEU in 
its assessment of any possible state measure constituting aid confirmed in Servizi Ausiliari 
                                                 
19 See Protocol No. 27 to the TEU and TFEU on the internal market and competition. 
20 Lang – Cottani – Petruzzi – Storck 2019, p. 507 and Quigley 2015, p. 255. 
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Dottori Commericalisti. 21  The Commission has listed general principles with respect to 
evaluation of the state aid in its notice on notion of state aid but many of these doctrines have 
also been developing through the case law of CJEU.22 However, due to the lack of precise 
nature, the notice provides further clarification and explanation on the key concepts relating to 
assessment of aid and, therefore, one of the most sufficient sources for state aid purposes. It 
must also be noticed that the Article 107(1) TFEU states “any aid in form whatsoever”, which 
leaves a lot of open room for interpretation and therefore, the treaty provision does not 
automatically exclude any measure per se outside of the application.  
Given the Article 107(1) TFEU vague wording, the Article 107(2) TFEU also exempts certain 
types of aid granted by the member state as well as the conditions listed in the Article 107(3) 
TFEU leaves some discretion to grant of aid that may be coherent with the internal market for, 
e.g., those that are promoting a good cause.23 Applicability of Articles 107(2) and 107(3) TFEU 
are however in the discretion of the Commission. Despite of the exemptions provided in the 
treaty, due to the current open form of the article, the Commission has been active in intervening 
arrangements that, for instance, would otherwise be in the sole competence of the member state 
– most notably tax arrangements. However, as mentioned, for Article 107(1) TFEU to fully 
apply, the measure needs to fulfill the four above mentioned criteria. 
2.1.1 Advantageous 
In De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen, notion of advantage determined broadly. 24  CJEU 
confirmed that the doctrine that flows from the Article 107(1) TFEU regarding any form itself 
that those measures, which lower the normal charges that usually should be included in the 
financial budget of the tax payer may give rise to prohibited state aid.25 Basically, as the 
definition does not flow from the treaties, this task for evaluation was granted to CJEU to 
define.26 An advantage is any economic benefit, which an undertaking could not have obtained 
in case the State would not have intervened in any way.27 One could understand this criterion 
as both active or passive intervention, as long as it deviates from the concept of normal taxation. 
When evaluating the advantage of the undertaking, the mere effect it has on the undertaking is 
                                                 
21 See C-451/03 Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commericalisti (2006) paragraph 56 and C-341/06 P & C-342/06 P 
Chronopost v UFEX (2008) paragraph 122. 
22 Commission Notice 2016. 
23 Article 107(2) TFEU and Article 107(3) TFEU. 
24 C-30/59 Steenkolenmijnen v High Authority (1961), paragraph 39. 
25 C-30/59 Gezamenlijke Steenkolemijnen (1961), paragraph 3. 
26 Lopez 2015, p. 71. 
27 Commission Notice 2016, paragraph 4.1. 
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considered relevant, not the actual cause or the objective behind the intervention by the state.28 
This allows the Commission to perform its assessment to the extent that it is not relevant to 
evaluate whether the treatment would be compulsory or not for the undertaking in the context 
of national law.29 
The most straight forward way to analyze this for the CJEU is to consider whether the position 
of the particular company has improved in any way after it has been provided with the aid 
measure from the state.30 In SFEI v La Poste, this assessment was referred to the fact whether 
the undertaking would have received the same advantage under the normal market conditions.31 
If not the case, this may be a sign of possible state aid. The CJEU has in its case law interpreted 
the notion of aid quite broadly. This approach may also be relatively easy to understand as the 
tax payer may receive benefit in a way or another and therefore the notion of aid cannot be 
defined as such.32 There is a clear extinction between aid and subsidy and the aid has a broader 
meaning in this sense.33 As the subsidy only covers monetary reimbursements form the public 
sector, the notion of aid on the other hand can be deemed to cover all measures from the state 
that improve the financial or economic position of the tax payer.34  
The exact form of the advantage is irrelevant as both granting of positively affecting aid as well 
as relief of certain burden that would normally be in place for the undertaking constitute and 
advantage.35 In GEMO, the CJEU made a very significant decision in this area as it broadened 
the definition of measure especially in the field of different types of charges that could be 
included in the budget of an undertaking: 
“--- the notion of aid can thus encompass not only positive benefits such as subsidies, 
loans or direct investment in the capital of enterprises, but also interventions which, 
in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of 
an undertaking and which therefore, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the 
word, are of the same character and have the same effect.36” 
It is important to notice that an undertaking being in a more competitive or favorable position, 
e.g. position being the result of some various factors having impact on production costs in the 
                                                 
28 C-173/73 Italy v Commission (1974), paragraph 13. 
29 Commission Decision 2004/339/EC on the measures implemented by Italy for RAI SpA, paragraph 69; and 
Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly of C-251/97 France v Commission, (1998), paragraph 26. 
30 C-173/73 Italy v Commission (1974), paragraph 83. 
31 C-39/94 SFEI v La Poste (1996), paragraph 60. 
32 Raitio 2010, p. 593 and Craig – de Burca 2008, p. 1087. 
33 C-30/59 Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg (1961) paragraph 19; and Raitio 2010, p. 594. 
34 Siikavirta 2006, p. 89-90. 
35 C-280/00 Altmark Trans (2003), paragraph 84. 
36 C-126/01 GEMO (2003), paragraph 28, see also C-156/98 Germany v Commission (2000), paragraph 25, and 
Joined Cases C-328/99 and C-399/00 Italy and SIM 2 Multimedia v Commission (2003), paragraph 35. 
 
13 
different Member States, than others is not per se considered prohibited as the notion of 
advantage is based on an analysis of the economic circumstances of an taxpayer in its own legal 
and factual context with and without the measure.37 This makes the assessment of advantage to 
somewhat difficult. Should we consider, e.g., the business model of a group of undertakings 
differing from others and this happens to result to certain amount of tax because the business 
model and the transactions flows therein may affect overall corporate taxation base, this could 
also lead to conclusion of prohibited advantage in the evaluation. Therefore, the purpose of 
state aid policy is not to intervene on effectiveness of an undertaking in relation to others as this 
is something all companies should pursue. However, for advantageous aid to be against state 
aid regulation, there also needs to be selective nature as explained in the following section. 
2.1.2 Selectiveness 
Selectiveness refers to favoring of certain business activities.38 In order for aid to be prohibited, 
it needs to be of selective nature. In other words, if the advantage or gain is for every 
undertaking available, no unequal treatment is necessarily constituting and therefore no aid at 
hand. Should the advantage to be granted for only certain undertakings or only production of 
certain goods over other, it receives extra benefit compared to other tax payers on a selective 
basis and is thus prohibited.39 In French Exports Rediscount Rate, broad meaning for the notion 
in CJEU assessment was confirmed.40 For example, material selectivity can be de jure, i.e. 
resulting from the regulative criteria for giving certain measure reserved legally and formally 
merely for certain undertakings due to their size, active or legal form, or de facto meaning that 
the selectivity factually exists even if the formal criteria is applied in general and objective 
terms, the structure of the measure nevertheless has an impact on significantly favoring only 
certain undertakings.41 After all, as confirmed in British Aggregates, state interventions are 
assessed based on the effects independently from the techniques used to implement these 
interventions.42 
Measures that prima facie apply equally to all companies but nonetheless still are available 
through discretion of the public administration may be considered selective.43 This was already 
                                                 
37 See C-173/73 Italy v Commission (1974), paragraph 17. 
38 Joutsamo – Aalto – Kaila – Maunu 2000, p. 604. 
39 C-409/00 Spain v Commission (2003), paragraph 47; and C-126/01 GEMO (2003), paragraph 35. 
40 Joined Cases C-6/69 and C-11/69 Commission v France (1969). 
41 Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos and others (2011), paragraph 52. and Joined Cases C-106/09 P 
and C-107/09 P Commission and Spain v. Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom (2011). 
42 C-487/06 P British Aggregates Association v. Commission of the European Communities and United Kingdom. 
(2008) I-10515. 
43 See C-256/97 DMTransport (1999), paragraph 27. 
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confirmed in France v Commission in 1996.44 This may very much be the case with different 
tax related assessments as the tax authorities can obtain a lot of discretion for determining the 
actual acceptability or the conditions for granting the advantage for the beneficiaries in the first 
place. It is clear that not only active measures taken by the state is caught by the article but also 
those measures that lower the usual costs for the undertaking that relate to business activities 
on a normal basis.45 What in the end constitutes the notion of selectivity, is that the state 
measure puts one of the tax payers in a preferable economic position compared to other tax 
payers.46 
Ad hoc -positive measures that benefit one or even more companies is usually not difficult to 
consider selective as they grant favorable treatment for these companies. 47  However, the 
assessment becomes a bit trickier when the fiscal measures mitigate some costs of the 
undertaking that would normally be in place and could in principle be applicable to every 
company. For the sake of testing the fiscal measures and taken by the Member State and their 
selective nature in practice, three-step test has been introduced by the Commission.48 
2.1.2.1 Commission’s three-step test to analyze selectivity 
In the case of those situations where Member States take broad actions that are applicable to all 
companies fulfilling the needed criteria for benefits that mitigate expenses. which would 
normally exist, the Commission’s notice includes a three-step test that should be applied in such 
circumstances to test the applicability with the Article 107(1) TFEU.49 The CJEU confirmed 
the utilization of three-step test with respect to fiscal measures in Paint Graphos.50 
According to that test, firstly, the so called ‘system of reference’ needs to be established and 
identified, in other words, benchmarkable normal circumstances against which the selectivity 
of state measure has been granted.51 The reference system can be characterized as ‘set of rules 
that generally apply to all undertakings falling within its scope as defined by its objective’.52 
This allows to include or exclude characteristics that are justifiable in the light of the facts and 
circumstances for the case at hand. In this regard, if limits of the system of reference have been 
                                                 
44 C-241/94 France v Commission (1996). 
45 See Raitio 2010 p. 599. 
46 C-387/92 - Banco Exterior de España v Ayuntamiento de Valencia (1994), paragraph 14. 
47 C-15/14 P Commission v MOL (2015), paragraph 60. 
48 See C-159/01 Netherlands v Commission (2004). 
49 Commission Notice 2016, paragraph 127 and 128. 
50 Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos (2009). 
51 Lang – Cottani – Petruzzi – Storck 2019, p. 519. 
52 Commission Notice 2016, paragraph 133. 
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put in place in a similar manner or, in a clearly one-sided and partial way, reasoning may be 
also be easily open for challenges. System of reference will eventually very much affect the 
outcome of the case as the undertakings will be considered comparable in legal and factual 
manner in such reference system.53 The correct definition indeed plays a huge role in the 
application as too broadly determined reference system does not necessarily reflect the reality 
of the relations of the operators as there might be big differences between them. To find a 
framework of similar undertakings position is therefore the key for rightful analysis in each 
case. 
In the second part of the test, determination is needed whether the state measure under 
evaluation differs from this identified system of reference so far as it puts comparable 
undertakings to different economic positions. The assessment is directly related to the nature 
of the aid measure. This is the key element of the assessment of selectivity through the test and 
the conclusion can be made to so far as if the measure is prima facie selective.54 On the other 
hand, in case the particular state measure is not different from the established reference system, 
it cannot be deemed to be selective in nature and the state measure can be regarded as acceptable 
and no third part of the test is needed. However, in case it is derogating and can be regarded as 
prima facie selective, third part of the test need to be proceeded with. At this stage, it needs to 
be established whether the difference can be justified by the nature or the general scheme of the 
reference system.55 For example, in Commission v Netherlands, the CJEU has held that this is 
the duty of the Member State, that has introduced such difference in question between charges 
of different undertakings to indicate that it can be deemed ‘to be justified by the nature and 
general scheme’ of such reference system.56 In case the selective state measure be justified ‘by 
the nature or the general scheme of the system’, it will neither be considered selective.  
2.1.3 State Measure  
In comparison to other EU competition law rules, such as dominant market position or cartels, 
that tend to apply only to actions taken by the private companies themselves, the core of state 
aid provisions considers mainly the measures by Member State. Nevertheless, in case a measure 
is deemed state aid, the recovery of the aid in question surely affects also the undertaking and 
thus they also bear the ultimate burden of risk.57As it has been stated in the famous Foster by 
                                                 
53 Commission Notice 2016, paragraph 129. 
54 Ibid. paragraph 128. 
55 Ibid. and C-159/01 Netherlands v Commission (2004), paragraph 42. 
56 See C‑279/08 P Commission v Netherlands (2011), paragraph 62. 
57 Lang – Cottani – Petruzzi – Storck 2019, p. 507. 
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CJEU, the notion of state can generally be defined to include various private or public operators 
merely if they happen to have a connection to state e.g. through shareholding or other link to 
organ of state.58 In Steinike and Weinlig, the notion catches both aid granted directly by the 
State or indirectly through its resources by public or private authorities established or granted 
to it to administer the aid.59 The uniform application could require the same approach to state 
aid but, however, it needs to be proven that the state has actually exercised control over the 
company and has been also involved in the granting of the measure.60 The CJEU has further 
defined in its case law, such as Ladbroke Racing and PreusenElektra, the basis of state measure 
that any finance or aid from state resources can be deemed to activate the application of Article 
107(1) TFEU.61  
With respect to fiscal measures, a loss of tax revenue can be deemed to be comparable to the 
same effect what would have existed in the case of state spending the same amount.62 On the 
other hand, the aid needs to also entail a financial burden for the State as confirmed in Van 
Tiggele.63 This is due to that, analogically, the measure e.g. in the form of tax relief is equivalent 
to the amount of loss of resources for the Member State since it loses tax revenues and thus 
results to a loss in the overall fiscal budget.64 However, in each case related to tax rulings as 
state aid, the notion of state measure does not require significant assessment whatsoever as the 
aid can be directly indicated to be granted by the state.  
2.1.4 Effect on competition and intra-community trade 
In accordance with the judgment in Philip Morris, the state measure is deemed to distort or 
threaten to distort competition when it has an effect to make the competitive position of the 
recipient compared better to other companies with which it competes. 65  Distortion of 
competition is usually at hand and deemed to exist in case the Member State is granting a 
financial advantage to an company in a liberalized sector where could in principle be 
competition under normal conditions.66 Therefore, the threshold for this to be exceeded cannot 
                                                 
58 C-188/89 Foster (1990). 
59 C-78/76 Steinike & Weinlig v Federal Republic of Germany (1977), paragraph 595. 
60 See Craig – de Burca 2015, p. 1137; and C-482/99 France v Commission (2002). 
61 See Raitio 2010 p. 597 and C-83/98 P Ladbroke Racing (2000) and C-379-98 PreussenElektra (2001). 
62 See Nicolaides 2015, p. 415. 
63 C-82/77 Van Tiggele (1978). 
64 T-67/94 Ladbroke v Commission (1998); and C-66/02 Italy v. Commission (2005). 
65 C-730/79, Philip Morris (1980), paragraph 11. 
66 Joined Cases T-298/97 and T-312/97 Alzetta (2000) paragraphs 141 to 147. 
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be seen to be relatively high and the Commission is very sensitive to intervene on possible 
hindering effects on competition. 
The state measure must hinder or have an impact on the trade between the member states. Purely 
inner state measures should be excluded from the application of Article 107 TFEU. However, 
in practice, this criterium may usually be fulfilled in case the aid has been designed to support 
undertakings with export activities.67 Therefore, in case aid makes the financial position of the 
taxpayer stronger as compared with other in the EU, it is regarded that the intra-community 
trade has been affected.68 In Boussac, it was confirmed that the Commission is not under an 
obligation to show the actual effect on competition and on trade between Member States and 
aid which aims to release an undertaking from expenses, which it would normally have in its 
business activities distort the conditions of competition.69 The effect on trade between Member 
States cannot either be only hypothetical as it needs to be indicated by the Commission what is 
the reason for the measure distorting or threatening to distort competition and having an effect 
on trade between Member States with respect to on the foreseeable effects of the measure. 
Anyway, it is not needed to point out the actual market or to analyze in detail the effect of the 
measure on the competitive position of both the beneficiary in question and competitors.70 
In Heiser, the CJEU stated that in accordance with to the CJEU’s previous case-law, “there is 
no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between Member States 
is not affected” and also “relatively small amount of aid or the relatively small size of the 
undertaking which receives it does not as such exclude the possibility that trade between 
Member States might be affected”. 71  It is clear from the wording that the threshold for 
application of Article 107 TFEU cannot be seen to be set too high and even the small scope or 
size may refer to possibility of hindering the intra-community trade. It is also enough for the 
Commission to show that trade might be affected instead of actually being affected.72 
2.2 Other regulation 
It is also important to understand the procedural rulings and its function in state aid matters as 
the Member State eventually need to recover the granted aid back. The Commission has the 
                                                 
67 See C-730/79 Philip Morris (1980), paragraph 21 and Raitio 2010, p. 605. 
68 Ibid. and C-T-369/06 Holland Malt BV v Commission (2009). 
69 C-301/87 France v Commission (1990), paragraphs 33, 44 and 50. 
70 C-494/06 P Commission v Italian Republic and Wam SpA (2009), paragraph 62 and C-730/79 Philip Morris 
(1980). 
71 C-172/03 Heiser (2005), paragraph 32. 
72 Craig – de Burca 2016, p. 1139 and C-211/05 Italy v Commission (2009), paragraphs 151 to 155. 
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competence in the first place to evaluate and conclude whether and aid granted by a Member 
State can be deemed compatible with the internal market. It holds its competence under Article 
108 TFEU to decide on the compatibility of measure within the internal market by going 
through possibly hindering aid granted by Member States and afterwards taking necessary 
actions regarding non-compliance with its decisions.73  In accordance with the Article 108 
TFEU that defines the procedural basis for the regulation it states that the Commission shall: 
1) review the aid that already exists; 
2) decide that the State concerned shall abolish any prohibited aid or alter such aid within 
a period of time to be determined by the Commission; and 
3) may, in derogation from the provisions of Articles 258 and 259 TFEU, refer the matter 
to the Court of Justice of the European Union direct in case the State does not comply 
with the decision. 
In this regard, Council Regulation laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 
TFEU has been given to deal with procedural approach to state aid related cases. Treaty articles 
are not the only source of law in this regard and some secondary legislation has also been given 
with respect to state aid. More specifically to regulation declaring so called General Block 
Exemptions, in other words, the Commission may declare certain State aid categories being 
compatible with the state aid regulation only if they happen to be in accordance with mentioned 
conditions and, therefore, excluding them from the requirement of notification obligation and 
approval of the Commission required by the procedural rules.74 There are guidance given on 
application of Article 108, i.e. so called Procedural Rules. 75 In addition, the Commission 
publishes notices, practical guidance and other communication on a regular basis to achieve 
legal predictability and certainty in the context of state aid regulation.76  
Had the measure in force been decided to be unprohibited in the internal market in the 
investigation procedure resulting to negative decision given by the Commission, Member State 
must recover the amount of aid from the tax payer according to the recovery decision of the 
Commission in accordance with its national law.77 The authority of the Commission decide a 
recovery of amount of state aid is only subject to a limitation period of ten years.78 It is worth 
                                                 
73 EU Council Regulation 2015/1589 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 TFEU. 
74 EU Regulation 651/2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application 
of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. 
75 EU Council Regulation 2015/1589 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 TFEU 
76 Lang – Cottani – Petruzzi – Storck 2019. p. 508-509. 
77 EU Regulation 2015/1589, Article 16. 
78 Ibid. Article 17(1). 
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mentioning that no fines as such under EU State aid rules can be given. However, the 
undertaking needs to pay the amount of aid back as it would have been in the absence of state 
measure, but the recovery does not represent the penalization of the undertaking in question. It 
can be regarded as terminating the selectivity, implementing the equal treatment in force and 
finally being in a similar situation. Nonetheless, as stated in the secondary law of EU, the 
Commission should not require the Member States to recover the aid in case this would in 
violation of any general principles of law within the EU.79 Such principles may include, for 
example, the principle of legitimate expectations and legal certainty, which have been 
confirmed in the case law. However, it is for the undertaking’s responsibility and not for the 
Member State in question to indicate the applicability of any violation of general principal, for 
example, on to which it had relied on the existence legitimate expectations to be in place that 
would eventually lead to decline to repay the prohibited state aid.80 Should the decision of the 
Commission be appealed, in accordance with the Article 256 TFEU, the General Court shall 
have the jurisdiction in order to hear and determine at first instance actions or proceedings that 
have been taken place. After that, decisions given by the General Court under this paragraph 
are subject to a right of appeal to the CJEU on points of law only, under the conditions and 
within the limits laid down by the statute. 
  
                                                 
79  EU Regulation 2015/1589, Article 16(1) and Commission final decision 2016/2326 on State aid which 
Luxembourg granted to Fiat, paragraph 355. 
80 See T-67/94 Ladbroke Racing v. Commission (1998), paragraph 183; see also Joined Cases T-116/01 and T-
118/01 P&O European Ferries (Vizcaya) SA and Diputacion Floral de Vizcaya v. Commission (2003), paragraph 
203. 
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3. Transfer pricing 
3.1 OECD Guidelines  
Considering the interest of tax authorities to maintain their full competence to tax undertakings 
subject to taxation, globalization brings some challenges to national fiscal policy measures. In 
the field of international taxation, OECD has done its best efforts to come up with a soft law 
instrument that would build the basis for solving taxation disputes and transfer pricing related 
matters. The most updated OECD Guidelines for MNEs states the international standard that 
OECD member countries have mutually agreed to be primarily used for international taxation 
purposes.81 OECD countries have agreed on similar meaning and interpretation of the content 
therein, e.g. arm’s length principle, on which the world of transfer pricing related assessment 
is mostly based.82 The need to address regulation in the field of cross-border taxation arose 
from the concern to avoid double taxation as, e.g. in comparison to profit subject to completely 
domestic context, cross-border intra-group transactions and its allocation may result to 
corporate income taxation in more than one jurisdiction while no superior authority has been 
established for resolving disputes between countries. Therefore, double taxation may also be 
the outcome for the undertaking operating in more than a one country.83 One of the main 
functions of arm’s length principle in the OECD framework is also to prevent double-taxation 
of entities that could take place e.g. due to the adjustments to the corporate income taxation 
since the national tax authorities are applying their own transfer pricing regulation in their 
jurisdictions.84 The meaning behind the arm’s length principle has eventually been set up in 
another OECD source, namely in the Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention: 
“Where conditions are made or imposed between the two associated enterprises in 
their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made 
between independent enterprises, then any profits which would but for those 
conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, 
have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed 
accordingly.” 
The principle sets up the rule that the associated enterprises should apply similar prices, terms 
and conditions as they would be in a similar condition between unassociated enterprises. It is 
understood from the above that an enterprise in the MNE group should be treated as separate 
entity i.e. as if they were independent entities and, therefore, the focus should be on the nature 
                                                 
81 OECD Guidelines 1.1. 
82 Ibid. 1.15. 
83 See the U.S. Department of the Treasury on the European Commission’s recent state aid investigations of 
transfer pricing rulings, 2016. 
84 Ibid. 
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of the transaction itself.85 Principle of separate entities lies on the basis for the application of 
the principle, meaning undertakings are seen as they were stand-alone companies instead of 
belonging to a group.86 In this sense, undertakings are therefore seen to have their own interest 
in conducting business activities. Evaluation of market-conditional arm’s length price must 
consider hence these fundamental concepts.87 The OECD Guidelines was developed for the 
first time in 1995 for offering framework for the assessment with regard to arm’s length 
principle for both tax paying entities as well as the tax authorities. Currently, the most recent 
edition of OECD Guidelines was set up in 2017 and forms the fundamental basis of assessment 
for the cases after the year in questions and includes the many new revisions reflecting the 
clarifications and changes compromised in the BEPS Actions 8-10 Aligning Transfer pricing 
Outcomes with Value Creation and on Action 13 Transfer Pricing Documentation.88 
3.1.1 Transfer pricing in the European Union 
In addition, EU has its own instance, which also underlines the use of arm’s length principle as 
a basis for transfer pricing assessment. The purpose of the forum is only to give guidelines as 
well as work as a supplementary opinion for the application of arm’s length principle and 
OECD Guidelines.89 In addition to the forum, the Commission has also given its own further 
opinions on transfer pricing of intra-group services, which are nonetheless also based on the 
advice of forum.90 
In the Commission’s notice on the notion of state aid, the Commission states that when 
analyzing if a tax ruling is complying with the arm's length principle pursuant to Article 107(1) 
TFEU, the Commission may regard to the guidance provided by the OECD Guidelines.91 The 
Commission has also published a working paper relating to state aid and tax rulings, where the 
Commission determine how the arm’s length pricing should be determined and additionally 
provides guidance on how a market based result would be defined in a rightful manner to 
comply with Article 107(1) TFEU.92 As the OECD Guidelines has been agreed and established 
between the international parties and enjoys therefore credibility, it provides useful guidance 
on how to get into good final outcome for the Commission.93 For example, it is said by the 
                                                 
85 OECD Guidelines 1.6. 
86 Karjalainen – Raunio 2018, p. 46. 
87 Miladinovic – Petruzzi 2019, p. 246. 
88 For more information on BEPS, See Malmgren 2014. 
89 Karjalainen – Raunio 2018, p. 42. 
90 Helminen 2018, p. 267. 
91 Commission Notice 2016. 
92 DG Competition working paper 2016. 
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Commission that in case the tax ruling and the tax model therein would have its interpretation 
of arm’s length principle on the OECD Guidelines, it is unlikely that this would be construed 
as prohibited state aid in the context of EU state aid law.94 It is clear from this statement that 
even though the Commission admits the applicability and fundamental basis of OECD 
Guidelines, it still reserves room for its own interpretation in state aid related cases irrelevant 
from the compatibility of the principle in national law.95 This aspect will be further analyzed in 
the section 4 of this report. Nevertheless, as the Commission accepts the mutual understanding 
of arm’s length principle with OECD Guidelines, the application is compatible also with the 
state aid context.  
3.2 Definition of an arm’s length price 
3.2.1 Determining the appropriate level 
The starting point for the assessment should be the transaction between related parties due to 
the contractual arrangements between the legal entities as well as the comparison between the 
conditions for related parties and unrelated parties.96 This is supposed to reflect the economic 
reality behind the assessment. As said, arm’s length price can be deemed to correspond the 
relevant market price but, however, this is very theory-based approach while the reality may 
differ in practice due to different factors will most likely affect the price setting of intra-group 
transactions. As a result, both tax payers and tax authorities may lack some of the information 
or it may be incomplete.97 For example, selling goods or services for related party may take 
much less total effort e.g. in sales and marketing from the selling party and therefore the lower 
price for the related party than for the unrelated party can be also deemed acceptable. Synergies 
are one reasons behind the price setting as some companies may even only provide services or 
manufacture goods to its related parties, some of them may even be so specific and unique that 
no other entity in the world is involved in the same activities, which makes comparison to 
perfect market-conditions as such basically impossible. 
Therefore, financial relations between the associated enterprises need to be carefully examined, 
such as terms and conditions of the transaction, functional profile of the companies, 
characteristics of the selling item as well as the business strategies. 98  After analyzing the 
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transaction in the light of functional analysis, examination whether it is possible to compare 
this to other transactions under similar circumstances needs to be performed.99 First, we need 
to evaluate the commercial or financial relations between the associated enterprises and the 
conditions and economically relevant circumstances attaching to those relations in order that 
the controlled transaction is accurately delineated need to be identified, e.g. that the MNEs 
operate at relatively same industry, and, second, the conditions and the economically relevant 
circumstances of the controlled transaction need to be compared as accurately as possible with 
the conditions and the economically relevant circumstances of comparable transactions 
between independent enterprises e.g. contractual terms, characteristics of the products and 
economic circumstances of the parties.  
Some results may also require adjustment to correspond the correct fact pattern but, however, 
the line between acceptable adjustments and so called ‘cherry-picking’, i.e. adjusting in order 
to get to the wanted end result, may sometimes be challenging to define. It is also noted in 
OECD Guidelines that as transfer pricing lacks the nature of exact science, and therefore it is 
more important for the tax payer and tax administration to have exercise of judgment while 
assessing the appropriate level of the transaction.100 It could be concluded that the thoroughly 
performed transfer pricing analysis at each step indicates the best approximate of the correct 
level. In the OECD Guidelines, the most suitable way to proceed with the best approximate is 
to provide an arm’s length range, which takes the different factors and adjustments more 
carefully into account.101 Nonetheless, when the transaction has been deemed ready to be 
evaluated, the most suitable method for analyzing the arm’s length level has to be found. After 
applying the selected method, this should provide an approximation of the appropriate level of 
the transfer price compatible with the arm’s length principle. 
3.2.2 Transfer pricing methods 
As the arm’s length principle merely sets out only the basis for the evaluation, there must also 
be practical ways for actual determination of the suitable level for the transfer prices. OECD 
Guidelines lists methods that can be used in order to define the arm’s length level of different 
transactions. The methods are also largely accepted and mostly used and applied in the transfer 
pricing related assessments as it is safe to say that the OECD countries in the context of transfer 
pricing relies heavily on these methods. There are five different and primary methods that 
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OECD Guidelines suggests being used by the tax payers and tax authorities in evaluation of 
arm’s length transfer price: 
(1) Traditional transaction methods  
a. the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP),  
b. the resale price method (RPM) 
c. the cost-plus method.  
(2) Transactional profit methods  
a. transactional net margin method and  
b. transactional profit split method. 
3.2.3 Traditional transaction methods 
3.2.3.1 CUP method  
The CUP method could be probably described as the most straight-forward way to reliably 
compare transactions with each other. It is designed to compares the price charged for products, 
e.g., tangible property and intellectual property, or services that are transferred in an intra-group 
transaction to another price that would be charged for a comparable or similar product or service 
transferred in a comparable uncontrolled transaction in circumstances that can be compared 
with each other.102 The transactions between unrelated parties and related parties are deemed 
comparables in case (a) no such differences between the companies or the transactions being 
analyzed are not affecting substantially the price in the open market or (b) such differences can 
be excluded from the analysis by performing adjustments. 103  Therefore, comparable 
transactions are those that: 
1. The same or comparable product or service is being sold or bought by both the related 
party and the unrelated party (so called internal CUP); or 
2. The same or comparable product or service is being sold or bought between the 
unrelated parties (so called external CUP). 
Even though there is no directly applicable hierarchy between the different methods in the most 
recent version of OECD Guidelines, the CUP method is the most favorable method to be 
applied by the OECD guidelines when there are sufficiently reliable internal or external 
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comparables available.104 The Commission has been in favor of applying this method over 
others when it comes to its recent state aid decisions.105 However, from all of the methods listed 
herein the requirement of similarity for the comparable may be deemed to be the most 
significant and hence should there be any specific factors, e.g. in the characteristics of the 
product in question, the CUP method is not necessarily the most appropriate one to be used.  
3.2.3.2 RPM method 
The application of resale price method starts with determining the resale price. Resale price is 
equivalent to the price that is being paid from a product that is firstly acquired from a related 
party and after that resold to an unrelated buyer. After that, an appropriate gross margin will be 
reduced from the resale price in order to determine the “resale price margin” that represents the 
appropriate amount of reseller’s target to make profit and amount to cover its expenses from 
this activity considering its functions undertaken, risks assumed, and assets used. 
The remaining amount, after reducing the gross margin, may be defended to be in line with an 
arm’s length price level for the transfer or product or service between the related parties. 
According to the OECD Guidelines, RPM method may be considered to be most useful to be 
used in a scenario where it concerns for example marketing operations.106 In comparison to 
CUP method, the requirement of similarity for the comparable products is not as significant in 
the RPM method but instead the similarity between the functions undertaken, assets used and 
risk assumed, is essential.107 
3.2.3.3 Cost plus method 
The cost-plus method and its application is based on the expenses of the supplier of product or 
service in a controlled transaction for this product transferred or services provided to a related 
party. After that, cost plus mark-up being at appropriate level is added to the expenses in order 
to reflect the appropriate amount of profit to be earned in light of the functions performed and 
the market conditions.108 This is justified as all the operators in the market usually seek to make 
a profit. The result when the cost plus mark-up has been calculated, i.e. expenses from the 
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activity plus the appropriate mark-up, may be regarded as an arm's length price of the 
transaction between related parties.  
Cost plus method usually is most useful where services are being provided or semi-finished 
goods are being transferred between related parties. The arm’s length mark-up can be either be 
compared with internal comparable, i.e. a mark-up that the buyer earns from an transaction 
between unrelated parties, or with external comparable, i.e. mark-up that is earned by an 
external buyer in its business activity.109 However, in the case of internal comparable, it must 
be also understood that the mark-up with unrelated parties may be higher due to the reasons 
that the expenses in those transactions may usually be higher, e.g. due to the marketing expenses 
and other sales services needed for third party customers. 
3.2.4 Transactional profit methods 
3.2.4.1 Transactional net margin method 
The first transactional based profit method, transactional net margin method, analyses the net 
profit realized from the controlled transaction in relation to an appropriate base, such as net 
sales, costs or assets. The comparable from this relation is called a PLI as it examines the 
amount which is realized by the taxpayer realizes from related party transaction.110 Flowing 
from this explanation, it can be noticed that a transactional net margin method is very similar 
the cost plus and RPM. Similarly to those methods as explained above, the comparable PLI 
may also be either internal or external. The tested party in TNMM may be either the seller or 
the buyer to the transaction.111  
To fully apply the TNMM, a proper functional analysis of the related and unrelated transactions 
must be performed in order to determine whether the transactions are fully comparable and, in 
case not, if any adjustments are considered to be conducted for establishing reliable end results. 
The functions performed, risks assumed, and assets utilized in the business activities must be 
carefully analyzed in order to have the correct conclusion on the nature of the company within 
its group. The tested party, in other words the party to the intra-group transaction whose 
operating profit from the transaction may be verified by using the most accurate information, 
will eventually be the least complex entity in the transaction.112 This is due to the reliable data. 
                                                 
109 Karjalainen – Raunio 2018, p. 122. 
110 OECD Guidelines 2.64. 
111 OECD 2010a, section B.2. 45: In case of seller, the tested financial indicator is generally the net profit on costs 
or the net profit on assets. In the case of buyer, the tested financial indicator is generally the net profit on sales. 
112 See Peroni – Gustafson – Pugh 2008, p. 1245. 
 
27 
TNMM has been applied by the Commission in its decisions as well as by the tax payers and 
Member States in the recent tax ruling cases concerning prohibited state aid, however the 
application of it has generated different views and therefore it is crucial to understand the 
importance the functional and comparability analysis in this area.113 
3.2.4.2 Transactional profit split 
In the transactional profit split method, the primary aim is to exclude the effect on profits of 
unusual conditions that are being made in or put into a transaction between related parties by 
determining the share of profits that unrelated parties in similar circumstances, e.g. by 
agreement, would have expected to realize from taking part to the transaction.114  
In the first phase, the transactional profit split method identifies all of the profits that are being 
split between the related parties generating from the intercompany transactions in which the 
both of these undertakings are taking part.115 References to these profits ought to be similarly 
into account when applying the same method to losses. In the second phase, the method then 
splits the determined combined profits between the associated enterprises on an economically 
valid basis that approximates the division of profits that would have been anticipated and 
reflected in an agreement made at arm’s length.116 Hence, the purpose is to test the division of 
profits between the related parties in question. In transactional profit split method, both of the 
parties in the intra-group transaction are tested and, therefore, this method can be also referred 
to as two-sided approach, e.g. in comparison, TNMM, RPM and cost plus method on the other 
hand may be referred to as one-sided approaches.117  
3.2.5 Most suitable method for assessing the arm’s length level  
When it comes to selecting the most suitable method from the different alternatives, all relevant 
factors at each case need to be considered that could potentially distort receiving reliable results 
or have an effect on the assessment of arm’s length price or price formation in the markets into 
account. For the sake of the assessment, selecting the method must take the strengths and 
weaknesses of each of these above-mentioned methods into account in the light of facts and 
circumstances in question. For example, in accordance with the OECD Guidelines, not every 
method is applicable to each case at hand due to their characteristics, but it is necessary to prove 
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that the method is or is not suitable under the established circumstances. Much is also depending 
on the possibly available information for the taxpayer or tax authorities or the correctness of 
data. 
Some major differences between the methods can also be found. Traditional transaction 
methods are regarded as the most direct ways to determine whether conditions in the 
commercial and financial relations between the related parties can be deemed to be arm's length 
as they measure the terms and conditions of the actual transaction and compare them with to 
those between unrelated parties. 118  This approach however requires stricter comparability 
between the transactions themselves. There may also be a situation where transactional profit 
methods can be better applicable when parties make certain unique contributions in relation to 
the controlled transaction, e.g. fashion or certain products that contain such know-how that is 
not related to other products, where the parties engage in highly integrated activities, or where 
there is very limited publicly available reliable gross margin information on third parties. In 
such cases, measuring the net operating profit realized from related transactions in comparison 
to unrelated transactions may be the way to proceed even though they may give less accurate 
results than traditional transaction methods. Usually, in many cases, if the tax payer has seen 
the effort in trying to convincingly explain the pricing of any transaction in a coherent manner 
with respect to application of OECD Guidelines, this could as such hint towards the fact that 
the tax payer is usually giving a good and reliable estimation of the assessed arm’s length level 
of transfer prices. However, as said, transfer pricing is not an exact science and therefore 
disputes between tax authorities and tax payers may easily arise due to different views on facts 
and circumstances for profit allocation purposes through intra-group pricing. 
3.3 Advance pricing agreements  
3.3.1 Definition 
According to the OECD Guidelines, ‘advance pricing arrangement is an arrangement that 
determines, in advance of controlled transactions, an appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, 
comparables and appropriate adjustments thereto, critical assumptions as to future events) for 
the determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed period of time’.119 
It practically sets the basic principles and criteria for the determination of a certain transfer 
                                                 
118 OECD Guidelines 2.3.: This is because any difference in the price of a controlled transaction from the price in 
a comparable uncontrolled transaction can normally be traced directly to the commercial and financial relations 
made or imposed between the enterprises, and the arm’s length conditions can be established by directly 
substituting the price in the comparable uncontrolled transaction for the price of the controlled transaction. 
119 OECD Guidelines 4.134. 
 
29 
price of related undertaking for taxation purposes. OECD Guidelines refers to these preliminary 
agreements as arrangements but nevertheless this can be concluded to be equally applicable to 
advance pricing agreements as well as there is no distinction between them. 
The Commission has given its own notice on the guidelines of advance pricing agreement with 
a main objective of it being to prevent transfer pricing disputes and double taxation for un 
undertaking from arising in the first place. 120  With this notice, the Commission seeks to 
encourage MNEs and tax authorities to conclude with the transfer prices open to interpretation. 
In addition to this, almost all member states in the EU have negotiations on APAs with different 
undertakings based either on the domestic legislation or to the Article 25 of OECD Model Tax 
Convention regarding mutual agreement procedure.121 When it comes to the content of such 
ruling, APA does not itself necessarily contain specific information regarding the exact arm’s 
length level of certain transfer prices, but is merely of general nature even though precise and 
concrete enough to lay down the rules for resolving transfer pricing related issues between the 
taxpayer and the tax authorities.122  
Why would the parties then agree on such arrangements? Above all, APA has been designed 
for this purpose and from the perspective of legal certainty for both parties in hypothetical 
disagreement as it excludes or minimizes the possibility of transfer pricing disputes. This is 
because APAs tend to be in force many years for a fixed time forward from the time of forming 
the agreement since during the years the transaction flows may differ. Before application, the 
parties usually discuss the different topics and possible controversial transfer pricing issues 
regarding the company. To conclude, the APA is the framework to which the transactions 
therein will be reflected in the assessment. 
3.3.2 Content of the ruling 
The term tax ruling itself is mainly being used as a general term for every type of formal or 
informal tax arrangements and preliminary agreements between tax authorities and the taxpayer 
but, in more detail, a tax ruling in the context of state aid regulation usually refers to an advance 
pricing agreement, advance tax ruling or some other preliminary agreed tax arrangement 
between the tax payer and the tax authorities. APA application made by the tax payer should 
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contain the information included the most relevant topics regarding the circumstances of the 
undertaking e.g. describe its business activities, different intra-group transactions covered by 
the agreement, each taxpayer that the APA concerns, the preferred transfer pricing methodology 
for the intra-group transactions (i.e. the arm’s length price), length for the agreement to be in 
force, business strategy of the group and each countries to be party to the agreement.123  
This list is not exhaustive and, in reality, the amount of information to be included in the APA 
may become very comprehensive. The power of APA is aimed to be binding upon both parties 
and after the parties have concluded the agreement, the tax authorities cannot present opposite 
interpretations on the transactions included in the APA. 124  However, as mentioned, the 
agreements tend to be more general than totally accurate, which leaves also room for 
challenging. The tax authorities may for example supervise that the terms and conditions agreed 
in the APA will be followed by the tax payer in its business activities.125 On the contrary, in the 
context of state aid regulation, the purpose of tax rulings in general is to establish the correct 
way of applying common rules in the ordinary tax system taking into consideration its factual 
and legal circumstances.126 
The Commission’s view of tax rulings is nevertheless not to question the Member States’ 
competence to grant APAs to different undertakings.127 However, the state aid context brings 
very much a new dimension to the whole discussion on the relevance and acceptance of the 
advance pricing agreements. This is due to that the domestic tax administration is no longer the 
only public authority involved in the evaluation of the correctness of APA as the Commission 
is also taking this role for itself. However, whether the agreement is in compliance with the EU 
law is however dividing opinions and will be further discussed in this report. In fact, the 
Commission has emphasized that the objective of investigations in general that have been made 
in the field of state aid and transfer pricing is not to target the tax ruling as an illegal instrument 
per se, considering that it has very much supported the Member States and its tax payers to be 
in favor of the APAs for obvious reasons, but, in more detail, to analyze the tax rulings or APAs 
that apply any transfer pricing method to certain extent in order to determine the taxable 
corporate profit at the group or its entity level that may not be seem to result ‘in a reliable 
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approximation of a market-based outcome in line with the arm's length principle’ and therefore 
could potentially be deemed to grant a selective advantage only to certain recipients, which is 
contrary to Article 107(1) TFEU.128 
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4. Tax ruling as prohibited state aid 
4.1 Tax rulings and Article 107(1) TFEU 
Member States may ‘freely decide on their economic policy, which they consider most 
appropriate and, in particular, to spread the tax burden as they see fit across the various factors 
of production’.129 However, despite of this, national tax rules in Member States need to respect 
and comply with the fundamental freedoms provided by the TFEU.130 Naturally, this should 
also apply in the field of taxation and transfer pricing as well as the application of APA between 
the Member State and the MNE. Adapting the state aid regulation to taxation measures may 
however raise questions as it crosses through tax law, competition law, EU law, economic 
concerns and, after all, it deals with direct taxation that is a sovereign area of Member States.131 
Direct taxation measures however are not out of the scope from the application of Article 107(1) 
TFEU as confirmed by the CJEU in Italian Textile as the fiscal aid can be in any form.132 Hence, 
every measure of fiscal measure by the state may be critically reviewed by the Commission 
even without considering or trying to answer the question on competence. In the legal literature 
as well as in the Commission notion, three different types of aid from fiscal resources in the 
EU can be identified that eventually flow to the benefit of tax payer through tax system and can 
be considered prohibited.133 The following three forms of aid may be incompatible with the 
internal market: 
1. Aid may be granted fiscally through the domestic legislation, for example, provisions 
that grant the tax payer an advantageous treatment in case they fulfill the criteria or 
conditions that are expressly required in the tax treatment provision (de jure selectivity) 
but also rules that seem to be general but in practice only benefit certain tax payers (de 
facto selectivity).134 135 
2. Aid may be granted through the assessment of taxation, e.g., by the tax authorities by 
applying tax law in a way that is different from its normal application and favoring a 
tax payer.136 For example, this refers to granting a treatment that directly or indirectly 
lowers the tax burden of that company. 
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3. Aid may be granted through tax enforcement, such as tax authorities evaluating the tax 
liability of a tax payer in the light of the relevant tax rules but, in the end, does not 
collect tax payments from the undertaking by rescheduling or cancelling the debt.137 
As the all above mentioned three types of aid above could seem potentially to fulfill at least the 
criteria of advantage and national measure mentioned in the Article 107(1) TFEU, the second 
type of aid, assessment of taxation, relates most notably to tax rulings and agreements. Such 
tax arrangements may violate the rules by referring to tax rulings granted by the Member States 
to the tax payers fulfilling also rest of the criteria listed in the Article 107(1) TFEU and capable 
of hindering competition by granting selective advantage only to specific tax payers and, thus, 
prohibited. Such measures are also, in the light of the case law, of nature that may have been 
designed to release an undertaking from costs, which it would normally need to pay in its 
normal business activities and therefore deemed distorting the conditions of competition.138 In 
any case, further evaluation on the selectiveness of such treatment must be done. 
The line between violating and complying with the state aid regulation seems to be blurry for 
the tax payer in case this perspective has not been considered while preparing the APA and 
whether the complying with arm’s length principle in national tax legislation nevertheless leads 
to infringement of the same principle under EU state regulation. Thus, we need to understand 
that even complying with the tax legislation and being in that sense perfectly legal, rulings may 
still lead to breach of state aid regulation in case selectiveness in comparison to other 
undertakings As APAs have been also viewed by the Commission as a well-functioning 
instrument for both tax payers and tax administration, how did the tax rulings end up being 
analyzed in negative light for competition regulation purposes? 
4.1.1 Tax ruling as selective  
In order for a state measures to not be regarded as prohibited state aid, “they must be effectively 
open to all firms on an equal access basis, and they may not be de facto reduced in scope 
through, for example, the discretionary power of the State to grant them or through other factors 
that restrict their practical effect”.139 This can be regarded as the difference between a general 
and selective treatment.140 However, in Santander, the CJEU held that mere derogation from 
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the normal tax system is sufficient to show the existence of selectivity.141 The problem and 
difficult part in the assessment is to evaluate whether all tax payers may have equal and similar 
access to same treatment or is it only for certain undertakings especially when it comes to 
APAs.142  
APAs are not containing any illegal tax regulation or loopholes but indicating the transfer 
pricing principles and methods of certain intra-group transactions for which the tax authorities 
have certain amount of discretion. In this context, selective as a criterion is also somewhat 
tricky to determine. For example, it could be said that while the meaning of ‘advantage’ can be 
more easily defined by evaluating the tax treatment and its volume with respect to action by the 
Member State, on the other hand, selective as such also requires a benchmarking or reference 
system, i.e. comparable, in order to actually define the selective treatment.143 In tax rulings, it 
can be concluded that it is advantageous for the tax payer as it removes the risk of the transfer 
pricing audit by tax authorities for making false conclusions that would be in contrary to APA 
and the overall tax burden may de facto become more affordable thanks to procedural discretion 
of the national authorities. Yet, this does not mean that it is violating state aid regulation in any 
ways as the selectivity criterion needs to be assessed too. 
It is not easy to assess tax related cases since merely Member States and their governments are 
able to put taxes into effect and no private organization for comparison purposes with the state 
that acts an independent market operator is not available.144 The three-step analysis need to be 
utilized to determine whether a certain tax measure in the form of tax ruling could be of 
selective nature. The benchmarking system should be able to set up a framework in which each 
of the undertakings can be regarded to be in a similar legal and factual situation and therefore 
comparable, which is another condition for selectivity.145 Those tax measures that are de jury 
available for all undertakings, measures de facto only benefitting certain undertakings can still 
be selective under Article 107(1) TFEU although de facto selectiveness may still be open to 
interpretation, especially, in the case of general tax schemes.146 
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Thus, reference system should first be determined for the valid rules of taxation. The exact way 
this is done remains still to some extent unclear as can be seen in the judgments of BNP Paribas 
and Adria-Wien Pipeline.147 With this regard, CJEU has been criticized for not pointing out 
anything but that the reference system has been identified as normal in a region by the 
Commission and being the prevailing measure. Nevertheless, national tax system of one state 
could be determined as one reliably appropriate system in this example and this has also been 
used by the Commission in their recent cases.148 In the field of transfer pricing, as we have our 
system established, we should assess whether the tax ruling, including for example transactions 
and possibly questionable application of arm’s length principle, favors the tax payer in 
comparison to those tax payers that are in factually and legally comparable situation. National 
tax system as a whole could also be too broad for establishing a reference system as it considers 
integrated and non-integrated undertakings and, in this scenario, any different treatment from 
what is considered normal taxation could potentially lead to existence of state aid.149 For 
example, the transfer pricing rules and arm’s length principle may be a part of that reference 
system to which only integrated companies apply but its application in the tax ruling is 
constituting the derogation from it and therefore may be considered selective.150 On the other 
hand, too narrow establishment of reference system could let every measure outside of the scope 
of Article 107(1) TFEU and, hence, instead, opting for even too extensive reference framework 
would seem to be the more suitable way to proceed by the Commission and CJEU.151 
In Amazon, the Commission stated the fact that if the application of the transfer pricing method 
included in the APA is in line with the OECD Guidelines, the APA cannot as such be considered 
state aid under Article 107(1) TFEU but explained that the use of the possibly most appropriate 
method does neither exclude as such the possibility of a state aid.152 This leaves a lot of margin 
of discretion for the Commission in evaluation considering that the transfer pricing does not 
grant the tester with precise results. In order to be compatible with the regulation, the method 
that has been chosen as well as the reasoning in favor of its application to the particular case 
need anyway to be compared with the market-based outcome -standard by the tax payer.153 
Eventually, it is the Commission in this regard ultimately challenging the determination of most 
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suitable market-based outcome in state aid cases when it decides to investigate and further 
conduct its own analysis.  
The DG competition working paper pointed out that the ‘approximate nature of the arm’s length 
principle cannot be used to justify a transfer pricing analysis that is either methodologically 
inconsistent or based on an inadequate comparable selection’.154 However, it is not only the 
contested APA including ‘an estimation’ but also a potential competing result for a decent 
market outcome – in this case performed by the Commission – should also be deemed as another 
approximation. The “search for a ‘reliable approximation of a market-based outcome’ means 
that any deviation from the best estimate of a market-based outcome must be limited and 
proportionate to the uncertainty inherent in the transfer pricing method chosen or the statistical 
tools employed for that approximation exercise”.155 Due to these circumstances, estimation is 
the only realistically available option. In the end, as the Commission has referred in its tax 
ruling decisions against this background, the aim of transfer pricing is to be able to reasonable 
estimate of an arm’s length outcome on the basis of reliable information.156 The basis and 
framework for assessment is therefore in scenarios including a manifest breach of the arm’s 
length principle.157 As a rule, the main reasoning needs then to be economic advantage is due 
to non-compliance of the transactions with arm’s length principle. From transfer pricing 
perspective, this may exist in case the ruling is applying the wrong method for transfer pricing 
purposes or applies the right method but not sufficiently or in an incorrect manner.158 The 
Commission has indeed applied this test in its recent case law in the context of state aid. 
4.2 Challenging the APAs against the multinational enterprises 
4.2.1 Background 
In 2013, Task Force Tax Planning Practices was set up by the Commission to ‘follow up on 
public allegations of favorable tax treatment of companies voiced in the media and in national 
Parliaments’.159 State aid regulation was a powerful intervention tool and the focus has in 
particular been in tax schemes and rulings between MNEs and Member States. Political support 
from other EU institutions has been offered as the European Parliament has been in favor of the 
Commission’s role as ultimate competition authority also in the assessment of tax rulings as 
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these practices by the MNEs and Member States have been seen to be incompatible with the 
objective of internal market. 160  State aid regulation has offered the framework for the 
Commission to strengthen its powers to prevent harmful tax arrangements. More resources have 
been channeled to the Commission for strengthening the ability to intervene Member States and 
tax payers’ practices.161 
In 2014, the first companies to be accused of were caught and the Commission started formal 
investigations against three Member States regarding tax rulings granted by the tax authorities. 
The proceedings related to Fiat in Luxembourg, Starbucks in the Netherlands and Apple in 
Ireland.162 These investigations were soon followed by cases with respect to inter alia Amazon 
in Luxembourg as well as IKEA in the Netherlands.163 The list of companies in questions shows 
that the challenging has focused on big multinational undertakings, most of being US based. 
For Fiat and Starbucks, the General Court has given its judgments to those cases; Starbucks 
was ruled in favor of the Netherlands and no state aid was deemed to exist but, on the other 
hand, Luxembourg was found to provide illegal state aid contrary to Article 107(1) TFEU in 
Fiat. At the moment, due to the lack of CJEU’s involvement in the field of state aid and APAs, 
interpretation assistance in combination of transfer pricing and state aid can be found from 
another related cases. Further, in Fiat and Starbucks, General Court’s approach seemed also to 
favor the Commission’s approach on getting tax arrangements caught under the state aid 
regulation although the deeper analysis and assessment related to transfer pricing is more open 
to interpretation. 
In famous Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL, the CJEU assessed whether Belgian coordination 
centers and the direct corporate taxation that was conducted for other companies than 
coordination centers that fulfilled the criteria for application – in several respects, such as 
granting property tax exemptions and application of cost-plus method for calculating the 
taxable income at the flat rate of 8%, that corresponded the operating costs, were derogating 
from the ordinary tax regime and constituted a prohibited aid according to the Article 107(1) 
TFEU. In order to enjoy such benefits as mentioned in the tax regime, the criteria for the 
undertaking required several conditions to be fulfilled, inter alia certain amount of people to be 
employed, form part of a multinational group with certain amount of annual consolidated 
turnover, capital and reserves. Afterwards, these coordination centers were therefore treated 
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specially from others due to the criteria that was applied to them. the Commission had taken a 
stand that the assessment with respect to the cost-plus method was in contrary to the principle 
of equal treatment and therefore granting selective advantage for the beneficiaries of the tax 
regime.164 To assess whether this was considered as a selective advantage, the court needed to 
assess whether such arrangement derogated from the ordinary tax system. As for transfer 
pricing and the comparison of selective taxation with normal taxation, the CJEU does not 
specifically refer to arm’s length principle but rather defines the importance of free competition 
and equal treatment in the field of direct corporate taxation: 
“In order to decide whether a method of assessment of taxable income such as that 
laid down under the regime for coordination centers confers an advantage on them, 
it is necessary --- to compare that regime with the ordinary tax system, based on the 
difference between profits and outgoings of an undertaking carrying on its activities 
in conditions of free competition.”165 
The CJEU did not take a stand on whether deviation from the arm’s length principle is the 
reason behind derogation from the ordinary tax system or whether it should have been used as 
a standard to assess the profit allocation through cost-plus method but rather pointed out that 
such tax regime granted unequal advantage for only certain undertakings and is different from 
treatment of those that are operating in the same system. Even though the system of reference 
and the derogation from it was indicated, CJEU did not accept the counter argument of its nature 
to avoid risk of double taxation due to the lack of showing how this would be achieved.166 More 
interestingly, the CJEU points out the following: 
“--- the effect of the exclusion of those costs from the expenditure which serves to 
determine the taxable income of the centers is that the transfer prices do not resemble 
those which would be charged in conditions of free competition”167 
It is clear from the reasoning that the comparison of the prices is not made to correspond with 
the arm’s length principle but rather to the condition of free competition as the CJEU puts it and 
justifies the challenge of the method used by the Member State to calculate the taxable profit in 
comparison to other companies. As the measure related to national legislation or tax scheme, 
there was no need to intervene to the use of methods therein and the amount of advantage 
generating as the selectivity was more easily to prove by the application of criteria, which makes 
the CJEU’s approach more understandable. However, in tax ruling related cases, the 
circumstances are to some extent different as the evaluation is made for the individual measure 
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as well as the supposedly correct level of transfer prices has been indicated that also generates 
the alleged advantage for the undertaking.  
As confirmed in judgment of Commission v Deutsche Post, first, the Commission needs to find 
the breach of the Article 107(1) TFEU through the four conditions - intervention by the State 
or through State resources, able to have an impact on trade between Member States, it must 
grant a selective advantage on the tax payer and it must distort or threaten to distort competition 
- therein.168 The easiest work for the Commission is to find that the condition of state resources 
being fulfilled as, in accordance with the judgment in Gibraltar, all of the tax rulings have been 
granted by the public authorities to certain undertakings in form of tax exemption, which places 
the undertaking in a more favorable financial situation than others.169  Secondly, since the 
undertakings are part of a group operating in all or many of the Member States, any measure 
can be deemed to have an effect on internal market and intra-union trade as well as, in so far as 
the tax ruling has had an lowering effect on the undertakings tax liability in the Member State, 
tax ruling has improved its financial position and therefore distorted or threatened to distort fair 
competition, hence fulfilling the second and fourth conditions.170 As this requires no further 
analysis, these effects can also be deemed potential. 
As confirmed in Heiser, the existence of selectivity will be benchmarked against a statutory 
scheme.171 Surprisingly, the Commission does not evaluate advantage and selective separately 
but together – as a selective advantage. Nevertheless, with regard to this condition, in 
Commission’s view in so far as the tax ruling has ended up in a lowering of the tax liability for 
the undertaking in the Member State by differencing from the amount of tax, which the 
undertaking would have been liable to pay under the ordinary corporate income tax system, this 
advantage may be regarded as selective in nature.172 Three-step analysis must be used in case a 
particular fiscal measure can be deemed to be selective as the CJEU has confirmed in Paint 
Graphos.173 This brings also the analysis closer to application of arm’s length principle from 
the EU state aid point of view due to that fact that it is necessary to evaluate the level of selective 
measure for the transfer prices in a certain framework – the APA and its application of arm’s 
length principle and other transfer pricing related matters in this case is the instance creating 
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the benefit for the tax payer. As the advantage, in this case the tax ruling between the Member 
State and the tax payer and its result, has been identified, the framework for the selectivity 
analysis of the advantage in accordance with the three-step test is as follows: 
1) Establishment and identification of system of reference 
2) Did the tax measure constitute a derogation from the reference system and would it 
generally be comparable with identification of the advantage granted to the 
beneficiary under that measure? 
3) Could the derogation be justified by the Member State? 
4.2.2 Establishing a reference system 
The advantage may only be deemed to exist by establishing a comparison between the aid 
measures benefitting the tax payer and the situation in the absence of such aid and thus a 
reference system needs to be ‘composed of a consistent set of rules that apply on the basis of 
objective criteria to all undertakings falling within its scope as defined by its objective’.174 In 
Starbucks, the reference system was considered to be the entire Dutch CIT system.175 This is a 
similar approach in the previous decisions because in every tax ruling related case the reference 
system was deemed to be the CIT system or the ordinary rules of corporate taxation of that in 
the aid granting Member State, i.e. Luxembourg’s corporate tax system in Fiat 176  and 
Starbucks177 as well as Ireland’s corporate tax system in Apple.178 Indeed, the determination 
plays an important role with respect to the final outcome of the assessment.179 
As discussed in section 4.1.1, by making the reference to the entire CIT system as ordinary 
rules, the system will take both group companies as well as stand-alone companies into account 
without making distinction between them. This conclusion by the Commission is crucial for 
their argumentation, since, should the integrated and non-integrated be deemed in different 
legal and factual position, it would also practically be acceptable to treat them differently 
without violating the state aid regulation. In Starbucks, according to the Commission, as they 
are all taxed in a similar manner with the same objective of taxing all Dutch companies subject 
to tax irrespective their company type and there is no derogation in the Dutch tax legislation 
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either.180 The objective of Dutch CIT system indicated that undertakings established in the 
Netherlands are resident taxpayers and are subject to corporate income tax on their worldwide 
income in comparison to undertakings not established in the Netherlands are non-resident 
companies and are subject to tax with regard to income from Netherlands sources.181 Even 
though a difference in determining the taxable profits of non-integrated companies and 
integrated companies would exist, this would not have a bearing on the objective of the general 
CIT system.182 Thus, the line of reasoning considers no need for distinction between types of 
undertakings and both non-integrated and integrated companies are considered to be 
comparable and factually and legally similar positions. This is somewhat straight-forward 
interpretation and broadens the system of reference as much as possible. 
This reasoning by the Commission finally ends up to a conclusion that the different way of 
calculating the taxable corporate income profit of unrelated undertakings had no reasoning on 
the objective of the system of reference, which is usually ‘taxation of the profits of all 
companies subject to tax in the Member State’.183 The distinction between drawing a line to 
what is to be included in the reference system is not easily determined. There are still certain 
problems with this approach as pointed out by the tax payers and Member States in their 
response. Stand-alone and integrated undertaking are not always in a similar situation legally 
and factually. There are usually differences between them, e.g. related to pricing policy.184 
References are made to Groepsrentebox decision where the Commission took a stand that 
related companies cannot be seen to be in a similar position legally and factually similar to that 
of unrelated companies.185 Same reasoning was made also in Apple and Fiat.186 
The parties involved argued for instance that the reference system determined by the 
Commission was erroneous and correct system of reference should have been identified to 
indicate more precisely to the corporate income tax law with the arm’s length principle under 
domestic legislation providing guidance on the right application and thus could not be result to 
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conclusion of selective advantage. 187  This line of reasoning is however dismissed by the 
Commission by referring to the intrinsic objectives of tax systems to tax all the companies for 
fiscal purposes, which does not seem to leave that much room for interpretation.188 The most 
importance in the assessment is apparently given to the fact that eventually the aim for the taken 
state measures in the contested tax ruling is to determine the basis for taxable profit for each 
undertaking in question on their local income in a similar manner to all companies within the 
tax jurisdiction, including stand-alone resident companies, and under the CIT system or 
ordinary rules of corporate taxation. 189  With regard to decision in Groepsrentebox, the 
Commission recalls that it is not bound by its previous decisional-practice and potential aid 
measures need to be assessed on the basis of their own merits under the objective criteria.190 
Taxation of profits of each undertaking residing in the Member State similarly without any 
distinction between them and justifying this by objective of the tax system as the main argument 
for establishment is perhaps more simply created system of reference without reviewing the 
actual content of the national tax legislation. 191 Eventually, arm’s length principle as equally 
relevant for both non-integrated and integrated companies will include elements that are part of 
the system of reference without any limits and thus allows the Commission to proceed with its 
assessment in this regard even though transfer pricing regulation does not concern non-
integrated companies at any level in domestic legislation. This makes the argument by Member 
States easily supportable: If there is special regulation available related to the matter, should 
this be the starting point for the evaluation? Otherwise, the threshold for selectivity is more 
likely to fulfill too easily as there are always differences between prices between unrelated and 
related parties as pointed out above. In this case, it would have still been also possible to 
evaluate whether APA and the application of arm’s length principle creates a derogation from 
that system of reference creating a selective advantage to the tax payer.  
In Fiat, Luxembourg and FTT did not only have different opinion on incorrectly established 
reference framework by the Commission but also their views were slightly different from each 
other. Luxembourg had considered that the most relevant reference system would only include 
those group companies that fall under Article 164(3) L.I.R.99, that lays down the arm’s length 
principle in Luxembourg tax legislation, whereas, on the other hand, the tax payer would have 
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rather gone even further in the determination that the system of reference in this case should 
have been based on the Circular of Article 164(3), which sets up the regulation that is only 
applicable to those integrated companies that are engaged in financing activities. 192  The 
domestic tax legislation also points out in this scenario that there is a difference between 
determining the taxable profit although the objective, i.e. taxation, is anyhow the same. In 
General Court’s opinion, this did not have an effect to the fact that the aim of the general 
Luxembourg CIT system is to tax the profits of all undertakings having their place of residency 
in Luxembourg irrelevant on the fact if they are integrated or not as well as that both non-
integrated and integrated undertakings are however ‘in a similar factual and legal situation in 
the light of the intrinsic objective of that system’.193  
In every case, transfer pricing regulation has been implemented to national legislation, although 
in Apple Ireland noted that it is not applied for branches.194 The conclusion regarding reference 
system with respect to transfer pricing could be seen as twofold from the line of reasoning.195 
One is that in case transfer pricing regulation is deemed to be part of the general system of 
reference, it should not be possible to consider an advance pricing agreement as prohibited state 
aid on a selective basis in that scenario unless the rules are not being applied consistently to 
non-integrated and integrated companies.196 For the evaluation of consistency, we need to 
assess the selectivity, e.g., through deviation from market based outcome.  
Second, in case there are no transfer pricing related regulation in the national tax legislation 
when tax ruling was appointed, it would be possible to argue that in any case this is the same 
reference for each undertaking and profit being determined in a similar manner, it is not possible 
for selectivity standard to exist as the benchmarking system is simply non-existent.197 However, 
it stands out that the arm’s length principle forms part of Article 107 TFEU irrelevant from the 
incorporation of that principle into the domestic legal system.198 Due to this reason, with respect 
to the standard of actually determining consistency, similar manner, and whether selectivity 
would be in place, we need to be able to further analyze the different factors within the 
benchmarking system, which in this case seem to refer to the use of arm’s length principle.  
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4.2.3 Arm’s length principle within the reference system 
It is necessary to determine how and to what extent is that ruling constituting a derogation from 
the reference system, leading to unequal treatment between undertakings that are considered 
similar. 199  The outcome in case APA may result to non-compatible conclusion, the 
Commission is obliged to reasonably analyze the application of transfer pricing methodology 
included in the APA. This would eventually lead to that only wrongful application and deviation 
from the arm’s length level could create such an advantage as the choice, application or result 
of a particular transfer pricing method could be contested by the Commission. Since the 
Member State has accepted the content of APA, there should also be some leeway for 
contesting. According to case law of CJEU, in the event of an individual aid measure, the 
identification of the economic advantage is, in principle, sufficient to support the presumption 
that it is selective.200 Hence, it needs to be proven that the methodology for determining the 
taxable profit in APA does not reflect the market conditions, i.e. same result that would take 
place for the non-integrated parties, and thus the allocation of profit is wrongful. Taking these 
aspects into account, the Commission states that:  
”[arm’s length principle] is used to establish whether the taxable profits of a group 
company for corporate income tax purposes has been determined on the basis of a 
methodology that approximates market conditions, so that that company is not 
treated favorably under the general corporate income tax system as compared to non-
integrated companies whose taxable profit is determined by the market.”201 
The deviation is therefore measured through the arm’s length principle, which can be deemed 
to be independent part of the application of Article 107(1) TFEU.202 In fact, when it comes to 
definition of such arm’s length principle is applied in the context of state aid assessment, the 
principle does not flow from Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention but is connected to 
a general principle of equal treatment in taxation that is falling in the application of Article 
107(1) TFEU and therefore binding the Member States and its the national tax rules cannot be 
excluded from this scope.203 In Fiat for example, tax payer reasoned that the Commission had 
failed to provide any legal basis for its application of arm’s length principle and, in Apple, 
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Member State contested that the Commission had significantly differed from its previous 
position in the Opening Decision, which originally made reference to the Irish Revenue’s 
alleged failure to apply the OECD arm’s length principle. Nevertheless, the Commission in the 
end stated that the principle existed independently in the EU law irrespective whether the 
principle was implemented into the national legal system.204 For example, also in Apple, the 
Commission already states that in the light of case law ‘reduction in the taxable base that results 
from a tax measure that enables a taxpayer to employ transfer prices in intra-group transactions 
that do not resemble prices, which would be charged in conditions of free competition between 
independent undertakings negotiating under comparable circumstances at arm’s length confers 
a selective advantage on that taxpayer for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU’.205 
All in all, the Commission did not examine whether the tax ruling at issue complied with the 
arm’s length principle of the national law of Luxembourg or Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention.206 Instead, whether tax administration conferred a selective advantage on the tax 
payer pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU by issuing a tax ruling that endorses a profit allocation 
that departs from the amount of profit that would have been taxed under similar transactions 
had been executed by independent companies.207 This should nonetheless be assessed in the 
light of OECD Guidelines as it states the importance ‘not to lose sight of the objective to find 
a reasonable estimate of an arm’s length outcome based on reliable information’ due to the non-
exact nature but the principle itself is included in the Article 107(1) TFEU too. 208  This 
reasoning allows the Commission to test the difference from a methodology that would lead to 
a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome.209 However, ‘reliable approximation’ is 
anyway subject to interpretation. 
As General Court confirms in Starbucks and Fiat, due to that intra-group transactions are not 
priced in the perfect market conditions, ‘when examining, pursuant to the power conferred on 
it by Article 107(1) TFEU, a fiscal measure granted to such an integrated company, the 
Commission may compare the fiscal burden of an integrated undertaking resulting from APA 
with same burden with respect to application of the normal rules of taxation under national law 
of an undertaking, placed in a comparable factual situation, carrying on its activities under 
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market conditions’.210 Therefore, the arm’s length principle can be characterized as a tool for 
determining by the Commission if there is a mitigation of the undertakings burden normally 
included and advantage in the light of Article 107(1) TFEU.211 Even though Commission’s 
approach could receive some support from the argumentation in Belgium and Forum 187 v 
Commission, General Court is of the opinion that the arm’s length principle is an instrument 
for determination whether an related undertaking was granted, pursuant to a tax measure 
determining its transfer pricing, an advantage.212 As this is used for analyzing the breach of 
Article 107(1) TFEU, this offers a legal basis for Commission’s investigations independently 
on whether the arm’s length principle has been complied with in the light of domestic tax 
regulation. 
This results to a conclusion that arm’s length principle is part of Article 107(1) TFEU and 
enabling the Commission to ‘identify an advantage in its burden of proof if the difference 
between the comparables goes beyond the inaccuracies inherent in the methodology used to 
obtain that approximation’.213 This relates also to the intensity of review for the Court as will 
be explained in section 5.2. Despite of its status under EU law, the deviation from the market-
based outcome would still be tested under the OECD Guidelines. From the legitimate point of 
view, this could still possibly arise further questions about creating a secondary meaning for 
arm’s length principle for taxation purposes as it is connected to the principle of equal 
treatment, which could be seen as some sort of side path for achieving the desired end result. 
This is due to that the Commission is not obliged to analyze the compatibility with the meaning 
of the principle in national tax legislation. The practical assessment procedure for transfer 
pricing methods is nevertheless trusted to the hands of OECD Guidelines and the Commission 
is required to justify its use of methodology in accordance with it. When the nature of arm’s 
length principle in the state aid context has been analyzed that is forms a tool for the analysis, 
this leaves us to the part that we need to evaluate the applied methodology in the APA whether 
there could potentially be an advantage for the undertaking. Hence, it will be necessary to verify 
in case the advantage is contrary to the established system of reference from the transfer pricing 
point of view. 
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4.2.4 Derogation from the reference system 
In first two decisions by the Commission was given in Starbucks and Fiat cases, both with the 
same preliminary negative result with a duty for the Member State to recover the amount of 
prohibited aid. In general, even though the APAs are fully compatible with the internal market 
in general, these APAs that were investigated by the Commission supported artificial and 
complex methods to establish taxable profits for the companies and therefore not reflecting 
economic reality by pricing intra-group transactions in contrary with the arm’s length 
principle.214  
4.2.4.1 Netherlands (Starbucks) v Commission 
In Starbucks, Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA BV ("SMBV") was based in the Netherlands as 
a coffee roasting entity, which was the only such entity of the Group in Europe selling and 
distributing coffee as well as other related products to its related party outlets in EMEA 
region.215 Green coffee beans were the main raw material component of that roasting process 
and they were acquired from a related party located in Switzerland, Starbucks Coffee Trading 
SARL (‘SCT’). In addition, Alki LP (‘Alki’), which is a group undertaking located in the UK 
and owning the IP related to green coffee bean-roasting know-how, was remunerated by SMBV 
in the form of royalty payments for the use of inter alia know-how and roasting methods 
concluded under a roasting agreement. As the SMBV was a manufacturing and distribution 
company in the group, the purpose of the APA was to determine, in addition to the amount of 
royalty payments, the level of remuneration for those activities on the basis of the TNMM.216 
Regarding amount of royalty, APA included that it would be fixed and based on the difference 
between the operating profit made in the production and distribution activities, before royalty 
expenses, and SMBV’s remuneration.217 Royalty payments were also deductible in corporate 
taxation and subject to withholding tax for SMBV. In the contested APA with the Dutch tax 
authorities, which was entered into force in 2017 on a ten-year-basis, the tax authorities had 
accepted the remuneration of the royalty payment to consist of a mark-up of 9-12% of the 
preliminary agreed cost base of the company. The use of TNMM method in the determination 
was also reasonably justified and documented.218  
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The Commission had made the conclusion that if the Netherlands had accepted the 
remuneration for SMBV’s activities constituted an arm’s length remuneration, a derogation 
from the reference system was at hand due to level of the royalty payment from SMBV to Alki, 
which does not lead to equal treatment between factually and legally similarly defined 
undertakings.219 Also, instead of applying TNMM in the case, which had led to a reduction in 
the corporate income tax paid, the CUP method would have been more appropriate method to 
determine the arm’s length level of the royalty payments and to determine the net profit of 
SMBV’s production and distribution activities.220 It was argued that the level of the royalty 
paid by SMBV to Alki should have been zero and the level of the prices of green coffee beans 
from 2011 onwards was in general too high.221 Since SMBV did not gain profit from the use of 
the IP rights from which it paid royalties to Alki in so far as it did not exploit them on the 
market, zero level of royalty payments should have been the correct level.222 For challenging 
purposes, internal comparable manufacturing agreements were found, i.e., which was 
advocating the use of CUP method.  
In addition, even in the case of TNMM would have been appropriate for identifying the 
remuneration for SMBV, in Commission’s view, the APA included also incorrect application 
of TNMM. In Commission’s view, purchase price for green coffee beans had not been 
examined even if that was identified as one of the main transactions for SMBV – the 
Commission calculated the average gross margin on the costs of green coffee beans and, in its 
view, the amount was overvalued and thus lowering the SMBV’s profits and taxable base, 
constituted a selective advantage.223 Commission’s reasoning is based on contesting both the 
used and applied transfer pricing method in the tax rulings, which led to incompatible end result 
with the internal market. Should TNMM applied in the case, the undertaking had not applied it 
correctly since SMBV was not the least complex entity and thus not be established as the tested 
party for the purpose of applying the TNMM. Alki would have suited for this purpose better. 
In addition, since SMBV functioned as reseller of coffee products, sales instead of operating 
costs should have been used as a primary profit level indicator as well as adjustments made to 
the cost base while applying TNMM were such that they eventually granted advantage to 
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SMBV. The adjustments made with respect to profit level indicator were also deemed 
wrongful.224  
The Netherlands however argued that if the legal issue was merely means of determining the 
compatibility of intra-group transactions with the arm’s length principle and if the method 
chosen by the tax payer led to an arm’s length outcome, the Commission cannot cast it into 
doubt on the ground that the royalty and the mark-up applied to the resale price of green coffee 
beans were not examined individually. The Dutch authorities also pointed out that the 
Commission did not take the stand that the OECD Guidelines would put the use of traditional 
methods as primary since the undertakings are not obliged to choose a certain transfer pricing 
method, nevertheless considering that the chosen method would lead to an arm’s length end 
result.225 Secondly, the Netherlands consider that the only transactions being analyzed within 
the APA are the roasting of coffee beans and the provision of logistics as well as some 
administrative services for Alki. Therefore, the purpose as such is not to determine whether the 
royalty payment is in conformity with the arm’s length principle taking into account that the 
Commission did not explain the reasons for opposite assumption.226 In any case, TNMM would 
be the best method to assess the arm’s length principle due to the lack of similar unrelated 
external or internal transactions that would be needed in order to apply the CUP method. After 
all, all of the methods listed in OECD Guidelines aim to find the reflection of profit allocation 
to be in line with the arm’s length level. 
Indeed, in the General Court’s view, the Commission’s argumentation fails to indicate the 
existence of non-compliance with arm’s length principle and dismisses the argumentation when 
it regarded derogation from the reference system. In rather straight-forward way of going 
through the six line of reasoning that as the Commission has the burden of proof227, mere non-
compliance with methodological requirements does not necessarily lead to a reduction of the 
tax burden for the undertaking and the Commission was not entitled to conclude that the CUP 
method had to be given priority over the TNMM.228 The conclusion made here by the General 
Court is very much in line with the interpretation of OECD Guidelines. Additionally, the royalty 
rate determined in the APA could not be deemed to be lower than it was due to that the 
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Commission had failed to demonstrate from the basis of the functional and comparability 
analysis that there would a reason to exclude the actual use of method by the tax payer.229  
With regard to level of the price of green coffee beans purchased from group company in 
Switzerland and their hypothetical overvaluation, the General Court confirms that it considers 
such costs of SMBV that fall outside of the scope of the contested state aid measure in 
question.230 This is simply not included in the APA and cannot be challenged or added therein. 
Due to the lack of determination of the level for the purchase of green coffee beans in the APA, 
the price of coffee beans for the years from 2011 to 2014 should probably have been contested 
through annual tax assessments, which is in the competence of Member State. Further, as for 
subsidiary line of reasoning, even though the more complex company in Commission’s opinion 
was SMBV, which was also the tested in the APA, and therefore not the most suitable as tested 
party for TNMM, choosing either entity will have an impact on the transfer price obtained, 
considering that the purpose of APA is to determine the level for taxable profit of SMBV and 
not Alki, since it does not mean that the choice of the more complex entity as tested entity 
would supposedly not indicate a reliable arm’s length result to be achieved more perfectly.231  
Further, if the choice of the least complex entity as tested party is erroneousness, it cannot be 
concluded that applying the TNMM to the more complex undertaking would lead to an arm’s 
length outcome and, in so far as the residual profits are allocated to the other party, the outcome 
should in theory be the same irrespective which entity is tested in the analysis. 232  The 
Commission also lacks the reliable information on showing that the use of profit level indicator 
of operating costs would not suffice as an arm’s length price, which is supported by the OECD 
Guidelines.233 Neither the adjustments used for obtaining more reliable set of comparability 
could not be set in violation of the arm’s length principle. As the tax payer had seen the effort 
and reasonably explained the alignment with the arm’s length principle, there was no reason 
whatsoever to believe that the Commission would have had a better reasoning in their 
argumentation. The line for burden of proof to show that there is a deviation from the arm’s 
length principle in the APA and can therefore be deemed violating the Article 107(1) TFEU is 
nonetheless relatively high. The Commission did not appeal and it would have been also 
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questionable whether the CJEU’s view would have been any different from General Court’s 
opinion.  
4.2.4.2 Luxembourg (Fiat) v Commission 
Fiat -case related to the tax treatment of Fiat Finance and Trade (‘FFT’), which had its place of 
residence in Luxembourg as well as the head office, providing financial and treasury services 
to related parties in Europe.234 As FFT had many differently categorized transactions between 
its related parties, most of the transaction related to intra-group loans and some other services, 
such as liquidity investment, cash pooling, foreign exchange and its risk management as well 
as other financing instruments to other related parties.235 The funding of FTT was mainly 
collected from the markets, such as banks and by issuing bonds, that were eventually forwarded 
to the group companies in the form of financing instruments. In FIAT, the company had used 
TNMM in the evaluation of arm’s length level of certain transfer prices in the APA that was 
accepted by the tax authorities and the issue at hand was not the incorrect selection of the 
method but rather the wrongful application of TNMM method. 236  However, contrary to 
Starbucks, the issue was not about the appropriate price level of the royalty payments and 
remuneration for distribution and manufacturing activities but about provision of financial 
services. APA between FFT and Luxembourg endorsed a transfer pricing method for allocating 
profit to FFT by intra-group transactions flows and this way enabled FFT to determine its 
corporate income tax liability to Luxembourg on an annual basis. APA in question included 
somewhat complex calculations of the taxable income in Luxembourg and, with respect to the 
use of TNMM, the Commission stated: 
“While the Commission considers the tax advisor’s use of the TNMM in the case of 
FFT to be appropriate, the Commission considers several of the methodological 
choices, choices of parameters and […] adjustments employed by the tax advisor in 
the application of that method inappropriate for calculating FFT’s tax base in 
Luxembourg.”237 
The Commission noted the most appropriate method for determining the taxable profit was 
indeed TNMM and justified on the basis that FTT was providing financial services merely to 
its related parties.238 Therefore, due to the nature of the transaction, application of CUP would 
be more difficult. It was clarified that the remuneration to FFT. which was the basis of the 
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taxable profit in Luxembourg, needed to be established by referring to the capital needed by 
FFT to take on its functions and to bear the business related risks.239 The remuneration of FFT 
equal to the amount, which forms the taxable profit by referring to the ‘capital needed by FFT 
to perform its functions and to bear its risks, in relation to the assets in use’.240 The calculation 
of remuneration included in the APA was as follows: 
(i) estimation of FFT’s “capital at risk”; 
(ii) identification of FFT’s capital used in order to perform its functions and to 
support the financial investments;  
(iii) estimation of the expected remuneration of FFT’s “capital at risk” by using the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”) and identification of the return to reward the 
capital used to perform the functions; and  
(iv) calculate the overall profitability to be left to FFT to remunerate the risks borne 
and the functions performed by combining the results of steps (i) to (iii).241 
For the risk related functions, the APA included the agreement that FFT remuneration has its 
basis on multiplying the regulatory capital of EUR 28.500.000 of FTT that was estimated by 
analogically applying the Basel II framework by the pre-tax return on equity of 6.05%, 
estimated using the CAPM242 and, on its functions (‘functions remuneration’), the result was 
received by multiplying the designation of FFT’s capital used in order to take on the functions 
that was estimated to be EUR 93.710.000 by the market interest rate applied to short-term 
deposits to be approximately 0.87%.243 The Commission considered the amount for return on 
equity of 6.05% as well as the use of CAPM included in the APA resulted to be much lower in 
the financial sector than generally would be in normal circumstances, which hinted that the 
arm’s length conditions are not necessarily met.244 
The profit level indicator used by FFT, namely return on equity estimated through the CAPM, 
was not seen as sufficient approach as accounting equity considering methodically consistent 
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from accounting point of view.245 Actually, the Commission found that instead of the used and 
hypothetical regulatory capital of EUR 28.5 million, they should have used the accounting 
equity, amounting to EUR 287.5 million in 2011 taking into account that APA was granted in 
2012 and, therefore, in other words, this has an equal effect of actually dividing taxable 
remuneration of FTT by ten. Secondly, the Basel II standard had not been the suitable 
alternative available in this case with regards to establishing the hypothetical regulatory capital 
as the Commission believes the conclusion made is erroneous and eventually resulted to 
underestimation of the capital and lowering of FFT’s tax liability. Furthermore, other 
adjustments applied to the amount of capital, namely choosing beta of 0.29 in CAPM for 
determining the return on capital and other factors deducting FFT’s total capital, were such that 
did not correspond within the conditions of system of reference.246 
Luxembourg found the Commission’s analysis containing errors on the basis of (i) capital 
should not have been segmented, (ii) endorsing the use of hypothetical regulatory capital is 
correct (iii) nor the calculation of the amount of that hypothetical regulatory capital, (iv) no 
error was made in accepting the deduction of FFT’s shareholdings in FFC and FFNA and (v) 
the calculation of the rate of return of 6.05%, applied to the hypothetical regulatory capital was 
correct. 247  However, General Court found Commission’s reasoning more convincing. In 
addition to contesting the fulfillment of the criteria included in the Article 107(1) TFEU, FFT 
tried to argue that infringement of Articles 4 and 5 TEU, in so far as the Commission’s analysis 
would lead to tax harmonization in disguise as well as breach of the principles of legal certainty, 
protection of legitimate expectations and rights of the defense with respect to the Commission 
order for recovery of the aid.248 General Court also dismisses the question on competence as 
national law nevertheless need to be consistent with EU law and if a tax measure in fact 
discriminates between comparable companies, it falls within the scope of Article 107(1) 
TFEU.249 
The FTT argued that any increase in the tax base in Luxembourg would eventually fully offset 
by an increased tax deduction in other Member States, i.e. referring to so called ‘group effect’, 
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which has been discussed also in Hungarian group interest tax regime decision. 250 . The 
Commission denies the interpretation of the judgment in a similar manner. In the end, an 
advantage at the level of undertaking in Luxembourg cannot be compensated with the 
disadvantage at the level of group company in another company.251 Therefore, also General 
Court considers Fiat group companies as one economic unit when it compares it to the treatment 
of stand-alone companies by referring to the case law of CJEU.252 However, this approach is 
still in contrary to the conclusion that selective advantage was in Commission’s opinion 
benefitting the whole group, where FFT formed an economic unit with other group entities and 
also other entities had benefited from the tax reduction granted to FFT through the pricing 
conditions of its intra-group loans.253  
4.2.5 One-sided approach or two-sided approach 
For the sake of transfer pricing assessment, there are two ways to evaluate the arm’s length 
level of intra-group transaction, two-sided and one-sided approach. In one-sided approach, only 
the features and functions of that particular party that is requesting the tax ruling will be taken 
into account, for example in TNMM method, which considers and estimates only the 
remuneration of the undertaking party to the APA based on its activity and functions 
performed.254 Strength in the approach can be seen to be that only one associated enterprise and 
its financial indicator need to be tested, which can make practically sense since another party 
to the transaction may be considered more complex on its activities or it may be difficult to 
receive reliable information on the another party.255 Regarding the determination, the residual 
profit will be then allocated by the undertaking to another related party operating in a different 
tax jurisdiction, meaning that no information is needed regarding the functions and activities of 
the other related party in question.256 One-sided method may be applicable to those situations 
                                                 
250 Commission final decision 2009/8130 on State aid implemented by Hungary for tax deductions for intra-group 
interest. 
251 Commission final decisions 2009/4511 on the Groepsrentebox Scheme which the Netherlands is planning to 
implement, paragraphs 80 to 82; and 2009/8130 on State aid implemented by Hungary for tax deductions for intra-
group interest, paragraphs 131 and 132. 
252  See C-170/83 Hydrotherm, paragraph 11 and also T-137/02 Pollmeier Malchow v Commission (2004), 
paragraph 50 and Commission decision, Fiat, paragraphs 341 and 342. 
253 T-755/15 and T-759/15 Luxembourg and Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe v European Commission (2019), 
paragraphs 38 and 300 to 327. 
254 DG Competition working paper 2016, paragraph 21. 
255 OECD 2010a. 
256 DG Competition Working Paper, paragraph 21. 
 
55 
when the related party, which is located in another tax jurisdiction, is holding some relevant IP 
being utilized.257 
In two-sided approach, on the other hand, both undertakings involved in the related transaction 
will be analyzed and can be argued that it should be defined more accurately and thus similar 
to actual market outcome.258 Generally, to be more specific, this method is usually used in the 
case of profit split method, i.e. when both of the parties in the intra-group transaction will be 
allocated with a share of the overall profit.259 This makes sense since the method in question is 
necessarily not depending on the overall comparable transactions in the market but, instead, 
aims to split the profits between the related parties in accordance with their functions and 
activities.260 Taking these above mentioned characteristics into account, two-sided approaches 
is more accurate to correspond with the arm’s length outcome in comparison to the one-sided 
approach.261  
Certain preference towards two-sided approach by the Commission can be observed in the state 
aid context as well – in Amazon and Apple, the Commission has its basis of argumentation on 
the wrongful use of these transfer pricing methodology and approaches.  
4.2.5.1 Ireland (Apple) v Commission 
Apple has also been largely discussed in the media due its relatively high amount of aid to be 
recovered, in which the Commission challenged two APAs between Ireland and Apple 
concluded in 1991 and renewed in 2007, that allowed Apple Sales International (‘ASI’) and 
Apple Operations Europe (‘AOE’) to determine their annual corporate income tax liability in 
Ireland by applying the profit allocation methods, which were accepted by Irish tax authorities 
(‘Irish Revenue’) in those APAs.262. In the Apple -group structure, ASI and AOE were under 
control of Apple Inc. located in the United States. In the more recent 2017 APA of ASI, net 
profit attributable for the branch was calculated in accordance to represent 10-15% of branch 
operating costs, excluding certain costs. For AOE, the APA concluded in 2017 established that 
the net profit that was to be attributed to Irish branch would be calculated as 65% of the branch 
operating expenses up to an annual amount of USD 60-70 million and, to the amount excessing 
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that, 20% of its operating expenses.263 Both ASI and AOE, under the Irish tax regulation, were 
considered non-resident companies in Ireland due to that both were ultimately controlled by an 
undertaking residing in a tax treaty country, namely Apple Inc. in the United States, and both 
having trading activity in Ireland in their branches, managed and controlled outside of 
Ireland.264 In practice, this meant that they did not have taxable presence neither in Ireland nor 
in the United States.265 Both made payments for the use of Apple IP under a cost-sharing 
agreement with Apple Inc, which also related to share of R&D costs with respect to new IP.266 
The payments were paid to their head offices, which in reality were non-existent according to 
the Commission. 
With regard to selectivity and different from Commission’s previous decisions, the 
Commission argues that in the light of Belgium v Commission and Orange, identification of the 
financial advantage of individual aid measure is sufficient to support the presumption of 
selectivity without it being necessary to analyze the measure with the three-step test. 267 
However, for the sake of completeness, the Commission has also applied three-step test and the 
APAs differ from the ordinary rules of taxation for corporate income profit taxation purposes 
in Ireland due to methods applied in APAs let ASI and AOE to determine the yearly profit in 
taxation.268 The Commission argues that Irish Revenue’s acceptance of the assumption that the 
Apple IP licenses, held by ASI and AOE, should be allocated to the head offices outside of 
Ireland, to which the by the contested tax rulings are based, is wrongful.269 This also is the 
factor that constitutes the selective advantage factor. The utilized method for determining the 
taxable profit of ASI and AOE has been TNMM with Irish branches as tested parties and 
residual profit being allocated abroad, i.e. one-sided approach. 270  As a subsidiary line of 
reasoning, the Commission adds that even if Irish Revenue had the basis for acceptance for this 
license arrangement, the profit allocation methods endorsed in the APAs were still resulting in 
such taxable profit for ASI and AOE in Ireland differing from a reliable approximation of a 
market-based outcome in line with the arm’s length principle as the methods are all in all based 
                                                 
263 Commission final decision 2017/1283 on State aid implemented by Ireland to Apple. paragraph 61. 
264 Ibid. paragraph 50. 
265 Exhibits of hearing of Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code Part 2 (Apple Inc.) of the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations of the US Senate, 21 May 2013, p. 24. 
266 Commission final decision 2017/1283 on State aid implemented by Ireland to Apple, paragraph 116 to 129. 
267 C-270/15 P Belgium v Commission (2016), paragraph 49 and C-15/14 P Commission v MOL (2015), paragraph 
60 and Case T-385/12 Orange v Commission (2015), paragraph 53. 
268 Commission final decision 2017/1283 on State aid implemented by Ireland to Apple. paragraph 259. 
269 Ibid. paragraph 260. 
270 Ibid. paragraph 265. 
 
57 
on inappropriate methodological choices.271 According to Ireland and Apple, in the light of 
territoriality principle that as it only has the authority to tax the portion of the profits of the 
company that is corresponding with the activities of the Irish branches and for profit allocation 
purposes only the activities that take place in the Irish branches need to be considered and the 
Apple IP licenses could not be allocated to the Irish branches for tax purposes as no 
management activities are associated with those licenses in those branches. 272 The Commission 
did not agree with Ireland’s view since ASI’s and AOE’s Irish branches do not have a separate 
legal personality from the companies to which they belong, in particular to their respective head 
offices, could be said to separately own the assets, namely the IP assets, or the liabilities of 
those companies.273 
The fundamental question herein is indeed where the functions are located and where the profit 
should be allocated. As the head offices did not have any other the activities than board 
meetings, the Commission concluded that allocating IP outside of Ireland was incorrect and 
what would have been agreed in an arm’s length context between two unrelated undertakings. 
Given the lack of functions performed by the head offices, since it did not control or manage, 
nor were they in a position to control or manage the Apple IP licenses in such a manner as to 
derive the type of income recorded by those companies, and, on the other hand, de facto the 
functions performed by the Irish branches, the Apple IP licenses for the procurement, 
manufacturing, sales and distribution of Apple products outside of the Americas should all have 
been allocated to the Irish branches for tax purposes.274 In Commission’s view, this approach, 
in accordance with the OECD Guidelines, would better reflect the economic ownership and 
reality considering that neither ASI nor AOE do not have physical presence or economic 
activity outside of their Irish branches.275 The Commission also did neither accept the argument 
on excluding ASI’s and AOE’s profit deriving from contributions performed by Apple Inc. 
employees from the taxable profit of Irish branches, since the contributions in R&D and the 
management of the Apple IP licenses held by ASI and AOE cannot influence the allocation of 
profit within ASI and AOE even though Ireland and Apple claimed that such contributions 
drove ASI’s and AOE’s profitability and therefore they had right to exclude it and thus that the 
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risk would be assumed and limited for ASI and AOE through Apple’s group policy, which is 
developed in the US.276 
Hence, IP licenses held by ASI and AOE should have been allocated to the Irish branches in 
accordance with the normal market condition since, as independent companies, they would not 
have agreed on arrangement where all of their profit from sales activities beyond a limited 
mark-up on a reduced cost base would be allocated elsewhere.277 In the end, the Commission 
decided that this was deemed to be selective advantage in nature as, in comparison to non-
integrated companies that are no table to create such transaction flows through intra-group 
pricing, it lowered their corporation tax liability under the ordinary rules of taxation in Ireland. 
Also, considering the almost non-existent and non-complex activities of head offices, the 
branches as tested and less complex party in the one-sided TNMM analysis with the profit level 
indicator of operating expenses instead of sales was incorrect. With respect to two-sided 
approach, the Commission emphasizes the importance of comparison of the assets used, the 
functions performed, and the risks assumed by both related parties in the transaction in order to 
conclude the arm’s length level.278 
4.2.5.2 Luxembourg (Amazon) v Commission 
Similarly to Apple, the primary line of reasoning for granting an advantage was the presumption 
of selectiveness in light of the case law but was also tested under the three-step analysis where 
the system of reference was also established as the Luxembourg tax regulation.279 Moreover, 
the problem arose from the one-sided approach in transfer pricing assessment.280 The advantage 
in this case was based via tax ruling for Luxembourg based companies LuxSCS, expected to 
function only as an IP holding company for group’s European activities under an CSA with the 
US parent company Amazon Inc., and LuxOpCo, which is wholly-owned subsidiary of 
LuxSCS and the principal company from operative perspective of the group in Europe.281 In 
other words, LuxSCS would only receive interest through intercompany loans and royalties 
from use of IP that it owned. Under CSA License and Assignment Agreements For Pre-existing 
Intellectual Property (the “Buy-In Agreement”), LuxSCS was granted with the right exploit and 
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sublicense certain IP from the US entities.282 The right to develop, enhance, and exploit the IP 
for business operating purposes was further sublicensed to LuxOpCo under a License 
Agreement.283 With respect to business activities, LuxOpCo was responsible for managing the 
strategic decision-making related to the retail and services businesses with respect to EU 
websites, in addition to the management of key physical components as well as treasury 
management functions.284 Any IP created or further developed by the LuxOpCo would be 
granted for LuxSCS.  
Above all, the Commission criticized that, contrary OECD Guidelines, the royalty payment in 
the APA was not related to output, sales or profit but calculated as the residual profit from 
LuxOpCo’s intra-group transactions determined by deduction of a routine return attributed to 
the functions of LuxOpCo’s from its actually recorded profit.285 In addition, the Commission 
considered that the functions and risks with LuxOpCo were more complex than those of 
LuxSCS relating to intra-group license transaction and, considering ‘the central and strategic 
commercial decision-making, concentrating the business risk of the entire European market’, 
the remuneration of LuxOpCo was seen to be too low.286 Luxembourg argued, with regard to 
Autogrill -case, that the Commission failed to identify category of undertakings, which would 
be the only ones benefiting from the measure. 287  Also, LuxOpCo has limited rights and 
responsibilities related to the IP and does not hold any IP itself meaning it has alternatives for 
using the IP. Therefore, it needs to be the least complex party and therefore suitable for testing 
in accordance with the TNMM. LuxOpCo’s financial return for the years should also be being 
compatible with the arm’s length principle.288 
However, the Commission argued that this was merely a legal, not economic, ownership and 
by endorsing an arrangement attributing remuneration to LuxOpCo solely for the allegedly 
performed routine functions and that allocates the entire profit generated by LuxOpCo in excess 
of that remuneration to LuxSCS as royalties and leaves the routine profit to LuxOpCo, the APA 
generates a derogation from a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome. 289  The 
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Commission calls for two-sided approach when assessing the profit allocation since, in its view, 
the applied method was not profit split method even though stated as such but TNMM due to 
that 100% of residual profit was attributed to LuxSCS for its unique and valuable contribution 
and this was one-sided approach.290  
The Commission stated that the TNMM is the correct method and have been applied as most 
appropriate method for determining the level of remuneration for arm’s length purposes.291 
However, since LuxSCS was the least complex entity relating to its functions, it should have 
been also tested party instead of LuxOpCo as illustrated in the performed functional analysis.292 
In the end, the Commission challenged the grounds that only the legal ownership of the IP was 
not acceptable to attribute the IP related returns to LuxSCS as it was included the APA and 
confirmed by the local tax authorities. For LuxOpCo, this approach on the other hand resulted 
to deductibility of these payments from its taxable income the Commission found that the ruling 
permitting LuxOpCo to deduct all of the residual profit paid in the form of royalties to LuxSCS 
from its taxable income constituted an economic advantage to LuxOpCo. 293  The final 
conclusion made is that this arrangement that deducted the tax base for LuxOpCo granted an 
selective advantage. With respect to application of TNMM and amount of appropriate mark-up 
to LuxSCS, arm’s length remuneration in accordance under the license agreement would have 
equaled to a mark-up of 5% to the costs incurring for the maintenance of its legal ownership of 
the IP, as those costs can be deemed to illustrate actual functions of LuxSCS.294 Further, in 
Commission’s view, 5% would have been applicable and in line also with the conclusion of 
2010 JTPF Report regarding mark-up for low-added intra-group services.295 
4.2.6 Consequences of the taken actions 
Commission’s and General Court’s approach in this regard is not completely stranger to, for 
example, what would tax administration argue against a tax payer in domestic situation by 
derogating from the arm’s length level, granted measures may be considered as an economic 
advantage putting the APA holders in a more favorable situation than others when compared to 
other companies.296 The nature of transfer pricing and related assessment nevertheless stays 
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vague with different potential end results. As when it comes to the field of state aid, it must be 
noticed that the notion of state aid as specified in the TFEU is a legal concept and therefore it 
needs be construed by taking the objective factors into account. Hence, the CJEU is obliged, 
after going carefully through both to the specific features on both sides and, considering the 
technical or complex nature of the assessments of the Commission as well as the counter 
arguments by the Member States and tax payers, perform a thorough review in order to measure 
whether these measures fall within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU and the fundamental status 
of arm’s length principle in this context – whether its evaluation should be based solely on 
national law or EU state aid regulation.297 
Additionally, the Commission has recalled that, in the third step of the three-step test, in case 
the state measure would constitute a derogation from the identified reference system, the State 
needs to indicate whether that measure in question could be justified by the nature or the general 
scheme of the reference system. Therefore, selective advantage granted by the Member State 
as such can also be deemed compatible in case a justification can be shown to exist. 
Nonetheless, the Commission has clearly stated that the burden of proof for indicating any 
justification lies solely with the Member State, not the tax payer.298 In the state aid cases, the 
existence of justification is somewhat however rare to be pointed out as Member States 
primarily focus on arguing that no selective aid or advantage was granted at all.  
In P Oy, the CJEU confirmed that the exercise of discretion by tax authorities with respect to 
fiscal rules not based on objective criteria related to the tax system, hints towards presumption 
of selectivity.299 If the Member State would reason the objective criteria behind the measure, 
the evaluation could be done based on this. Such criteria were not put into table by the Member 
States. For instance, Apple argued that the measure was intrinsic to the Irish corporate tax 
system and that the rulings contributed to the effectiveness of the system and were 
proportionate.300 The Commission dismissed these arguments. Had the circumstances been 
different, preferential and selective treatment of a certain undertaking benefitting its financial 
position in the form of APA could be justified, for example, based on to be deriving directly 
from the intrinsic, basic or guiding principles of the tax reference system in question, whether 
determined by the Commission or by the Member State, or for the ordinary tax system to 
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function effectively, such mechanisms are necessarily needed.301 This may leave however a lot 
of room for discretion and interpretation and would require the existence of sufficient guidelines 
in order to utilize this type of reasoning.  
In comparison to purely domestic situations where tax authorities may challenge undertakings 
for allegedly violating the tax rules of that particular Member State, the arguments are not 
coming only from the undertaking or tax payer’s side but from the Member State as well. 
Regarding the objective of state aid regulation, from the legislative side, the breaching party at 
hand is not the undertaking but the Member State. In this sense, the arguments by the Member 
State can be seen to defend and justify the ordinary tax system of their own jurisdiction and, 
indirectly, also the business model of the tax payer that has been accepted by it. After all, all of 
the measures that come into effect after Article 107(1) TFEU that are applicable to a particular 
case affect also the Member States since the prohibited aid is required to be recovered. The 
exceptions when the aid may not be recovered by the Member State can be applied if they are 
in incompatible with the general principle of EU law, namely the principles of legal certainty 
or legitimate expectations.302 When it comes to the interpretation of this doctrine in the related 
case law, the threshold for this to apply is high. 
Excluding the judgment by the General Court regarding Starbucks where no prohibited state 
aid was deemed to exist and the Commission was ordered to pay the relevant costs back for 
both the Netherlands and Starbucks, all the other cases ended up to the conclusion of recovering 
the aid back including the interest calculated from the beginning on which the unlawful aid was 
granted for the beneficiary until to the date of its recovery.303 The amount should correspond 
with the effect that would have been equal to the original arm’s length level plus an interest. 
This might seem like a paradox consequence of non-compliance with Article 107(1) TFEU and 
has also resulted to different opinions on whether the amounts that have been deemed unpaid 
due to the tax ruling, i.e. amount, which should have been paid if the generally applicable rule 
had been applied, to be recovered and given back to those third party Member States that 
actually have had an negative impact due to the tax competition and erosion of tax bases instead 
of recovery by that Member State that actually granted the prohibited state aid. Alternatively, 
creation of a common budget for such recovered amounts in the EU, although this would call 
on the Commission to amend and change the current rules in order to make sure that such 
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sanctions would be put into effect against those that have been violating the state aid 
regulation. 304  As common budget could face huge backlash due to nature of its tax 
harmonization and common fiscal budget of the EU, it is therefore very unlikely to happen in 
the future.   
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5. Assessment of the measures 
5.1 Reshaping the framework of taxation and competition law 
In the light of above explained case law, arm’s length principle and transfer pricing seem to be 
in the scope of application of state aid regulation for EU institutions to evaluate. What are then 
the practical consequences and legal questions that arise from this conclusion? Firstly, 
Commission’s evaluation of (i) selectiveness from transfer pricing point of view and (ii) using 
same or different methods for assessing the arm’s length level that apply to all undertakings in 
the established system of reference similarly makes it possible to challenge the APA in an 
effective manner. As for the concept of arm’s length principle, it is defined by the OECD 
sources and as such fluently applied by the Member States in their domestic legal framework, 
there is not any other source as a ‘competitor’ from which the Commission could draw its 
conclusion or give a different opinion contrary to OECD Guidelines. On the upside of this 
smoother outcome, there should be no conflict between understanding the concept of arm’s 
length principle as meant by the Commission and defendants, but, on the downside, there are 
number of reasons why tax authorities, tax payers and the Commission in this context can make 
a very different conclusions on the amount of appropriate remuneration level. In Commission’s 
view, before proceeding with the detailed transfer pricing analysis in each case mentioned 
above, it needed to bring the transfer pricing assessment to the framework of state aid 
regulation.  
This has also enabled the assessment of arm’s length principle in comparison to non-integrated 
undertakings in state aid context, even though, for national taxation, no scenario exists when 
these rules would be applied to them. At this point, for the integrated companies, the arm’s 
length principle in national law is not the only rule they need to apply with but also with the 
separate construction of the same principle generated independently in the context of EU law. 
Much of the force and argumentation behind the approach lies on the shoulders of CJEU 
judgment in Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission.305 There is ambition to intervene unequal 
competition through aggressive tax planning in the internal market or, as the Member States 
and undertaking might see it, push forward harmonization within the Member States in the field 
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of direct taxation, which has further raised questions regarding Member States’ competence to 
apply and define the correct regulation for domestic tax purposes.306  
Secondly, transfer pricing assessment has created the instrument for the Commission to analyze 
compatibility of the tax treatment with Article 107(1) TFEU. This line of reasoning can also be 
valid and sufficient. Is it however putting the domestic transfer pricing regulation and 
assessment at risk if the application is being challenged and interpreted by too many instances? 
The approach taken by the Commission is not giving the message that only the tax payer may 
be deemed liable for conducting aggressive tax planning and trying to minimize its tax burden 
but that the Member States and their tax authorities have failed to apply the OECD Guidelines 
based arm’s length principle correctly. The approach seems twisted as the recovery of such 
prohibited aid will eventually create a fiscal income for the Member State due to their 
preliminary failure to accurately and correctly define the framework of APA with the 
undertaking. Therefore, the indignation by the Member State seems understandable when the 
issue is seen as a question of setting the limits for fiscal autonomy. 
Thirdly, as defining the domestic tax legislation as the system of reference creates the playing 
field similarly to all operators therein, the Commission takes the position that mere 
compatibility with domestic legislation is not sufficient against EU principles. Moreover, due 
to the lack of actual amount that would be equivalent to arm’s length price – as well as the fact 
that transfer pricing evaluation is not always totally accurate – pointing out the ‘artificial and 
complex methods’ being used for indicating the taxable profit requires distinction from the tax 
payers’ choice to individually apply the most suitable method in a particular case. Terms 
‘artificial’ and ‘complex’ in this context may have been used to refer to cherry-picking of 
methodology from the company’s point of view, but, on the contrary, one can also argue for 
the use of more detailed analysis with respect to its facts and circumstances. Indeed, it is clear 
that the OECD Guidelines have also become more and more complex but their diverse and 
comprehensive application does not mean that exploitation of diverse adjustments would be 
worse, it in fact may refer to more accurate and up-to-date application.307 For example, in Fiat, 
the acceptability for performing the adjustments while calculating the amount of remuneration 
was denied by the General Court.308 After all, this question of reasoning is directly connected 
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to the amount of burden of proof required from the Commission and, as usual, the acceptability 
of such proof will eventually be judged by the CJEU. 
To conclude these three remarks from the case law, the Commission has a lot of interpretation 
power in the assessment of transfer prices and its newly implemented assessment of arm’s 
length principle may not always be precisely clear.309 Being said, it is not intended to receive 
an exact price for intra-group transaction, meaning that the amount of prohibited state aid could 
be determined by the Commission in case not agreed with the application included in the APA. 
Even though the Commission claims that the OECD Guidelines is merely a soft-law instrument 
and not as such binding its actions against Member States, the assessment of arm’s length 
principle in the light of the methodology in OECD Guidelines is of extreme importance in 
proving the existence of selective advantage. Therefore, as the existence of aid has been drawn 
from the application of the arm’s length principle, the Commission is bringing the arm’s length 
principle as laid down in the OECD Guidelines from soft law towards hard law by making it 
part of the principle of equal treatment in taxation.  
However, if the state aid regulation would be violated purely due to the advantage granted by 
the application of certain transfer pricing method in the APA, how are the Member States able 
to notice, considering comments by Vestager that the primary responsibility for ensuring that 
all tax arrangements comply with EU State aid rules rests fairly with the Member States, when 
is the limit of certain tax arrangement considered prohibited?310 It is worth questioning to what 
extent may the Member States be held liable for not pointing out the applicability of APAs with 
the Article 107(1) TFEU. Even so, when considering that the Commission should put its efforts 
on evaluating the manifest breach of arm’s length principle. Especially in the case of tax rulings, 
the problem, which has been largely discussed especially among case participating Member 
States, may arise further questions to the difficult dilemma of lawful complying eventually 
leading to a breach of EU law. Had the company followed the rules or guidelines of the national 
tax authorities, it may in any case be responsible for taking part in breach of EU state aid 
regulation. This cannot be seen totally valid from legal certainty point of view. Therefore, the 
more important factor for the acceptance of any aid seem to be the end result for benefit of the 
internal markets instead of question of legal certainty.311 In the legal literature, as a logical 
response to the Commission, it has been presented to accept the used transfer pricing framework 
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and methodology between Member State and undertaking in the APA and, when it comes to 
evaluating the compatibility with the arm’s length level and merely to concentrate on clear and 
manifest errors of application.312 This may nevertheless be seen already to be in line with the 
current approach with the Commission as shown in related case law. These aspects however 
need to be understood before analyzing the amount of burden of proof and intensity of review 
relating to the case. 
5.1.1 Consistency with the transfer pricing regulation 
In the light of the evaluation, what makes Commissions reasoning nonetheless impressive is 
that it has based its transfer pricing assessment on the importance of the functions and value-
creation of the companies within the same group, approach that is similar to the development 
of BEPS Action Plans 8-10.313 The main idea is that the profit should be attributed and taxed 
with the company de facto performing the functions, bearing the risks and owning the assets 
and, thus, creating the value. Also, in most of the cases the Commission has challenged the 
company that should be considered as the least complex for tested party. In Starbucks, the 
Commission contested that Alki, the principal company that was holding the IP, seemed to be 
limited from its risk-bearing abilities as it, for example, did not have any employees in its 
operations as the royalty payment represented also entrepreneurial risk of the Alki LP in 
addition to the use of IP. Thus, this resulted to overvaluation of royalty payments and non-
compliance with the arm’s length principle.314 Similar circumstances were also in Apple and 
Amazon as explained in the section 4.2.5.1 and 4.2.5.2. 
This means that the undertaking should not be remunerated for bearing of risk merely through 
existence of an agreement due to the possibility of, in Commission’s view, related companies 
eventually reallocating risks and prevent any application of the arm’s length principle. 315 
However, the tax payer argued that since SMBV carried out routine and low-risk activities, 
administrative and logistical support and, on the other hand, Alki needs to be the more complex 
entity due to exploitation of the roasting IP – and therefore also risks bearing with regard to 
SMBV’s functions as agreed in their roasting agreement. 316 General Court however dismissed 
the Commission’s approach on the hypothetical artificial reallocation of risk to this extent as it 
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fails to show that more reliable information was available to support its conclusion. 
Nevertheless, this argumentation is not completely stranger as, in accordance with the BEPS 
development, since in principle the companies carrying out development, enhancement, 
management and exploitation (‘DEMPE’) functions related to IP should be attributed with the 
share of the royalty payment for remuneration.317 This argument is strongly brought up in 
Amazon, that it was indeed LuxOpCo that was performing these functions and therefore not 
suitable for tested party as less complex, which would have actually been LuxSCS. The 
reasoning may as well succeed in front of CJEU. Indeed, the arguments in Starbucks were that 
the Commission did not indicate whether such less complex would be, e.g., the Dutch SMBV 
or some other company that would undertake such functions and it would not have any 
relevance if the receiving entity was some other company as it does not have an effect on the 
deductibility of the royalty payment in the taxation.318 
This development in transfer pricing relates to OECD’s objective to minimize the incentive of 
companies to shift profits to so called cash boxes, a term which refers to a company existing 
only on paper with few or no employees and limited economic activity trying to make an 
advantage of low tax jurisdictions.319 The rationale behind this is that if such cash boxes plainly 
provide e.g. funding for the use of another group company but performs only limited activities. 
and not de facto controlling the actual financing risks with respect to its funding, it should 
therefore be entitled to no more than a risk-free return – or even less.320 In fact, it has been said 
that the problem in this issue is not the power to steer intra-group transaction flows through 
transfer pricing but these so-called hybrid entities, i.e. entities that are not de facto located in 
any jurisdiction and may utilize the different tax systems within the internal market for 
minimizing their tax burden.321 This is even more self-evident in the decision in Apple, where 
the Commission argues through OECD Approach for profit allocation to a permanent 
establishment:322  
”As a first step of the profit allocation process, recourse should be to the physical 
presence of employees or people performing functions on behalf of the enterprise in 
the head office and in the permanent establishment as an objective means to allocate 
assets used, functions performed and risks assumed between a head office and its 
permanent establishment. This is justified by the fact that there is little ambiguity 
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about the physical presence of employees or people performing functions on behalf 
of the enterprise. --- Moreover, the 2010 OECD Profit Attribution Report, in its 
considerations specific to intangibles, specifies that, regarding the economic 
ownership of intangibles, it is the active decision taken below senior management 
level that is determinant for the allocation of the ownership” 
The Commission argues that (a) the assets, functions and risks of ASI and AOE, i.e. the related 
IP licenses for DEMPE located outside of the Americas, needs to be attributed to the Irish 
branches, as those companies have no employees or people performing functions on behalf of 
the companies outside of the branches and (b) head offices of the undertakings do not have 
employees below senior management level.323 The mere conclusion is that the profit cannot in 
this scenario be allocated outside of Ireland as this would be contrary to real market conditions. 
This way, derogation from new developments of international taxation related to transfer 
pricing and this non-conformity triggers also the concept of selectivity. As concepts and trends 
within international taxation are still developing all the time at the EU and OECD level as well 
as in BEPS related discussions, it needs to be remember that even the some fundamental 
principles in taxation, e.g. the arm’s length principle, will constantly develop in order to better 
align the tax challenges of the future, e.g. arising from the new ways of creating value through, 
e.g. digitalization and platform economy. Therefore, it is natural that the Commission takes this 
dimension into account when monitoring compliance of certain measures with Article 107 
TFEU. 
5.1.2 New role of transfer pricing in selectivity assessment 
The foundation for Commission’s assessment and eventual burden of proof is based on the fact 
that it holds the competence for the competition issues. For the sake of clarity, aids that are 
considered compatible with the internal market are here to stay and no market is purely 
operating through market forces without any interference by the national authorities. 
Sometimes aid may even promote legitimate objectives in line with the principle of 
proportionality.324 However, the objective of the state aid provisions has always been to prevent 
detrimental competition of granting aid between Member States which in the end would results 
to harmful distortions in the internal market.325 This allows also the transfer pricing related 
assessment as the Member States have eventually lost their complete sovereignty to decide 
purely on national basis from the nature of their aid to be granted. Without such established 
supervisory framework, huge number of tax reliefs could in general result to distorting 
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competition and eventually to the detriment of the balance between other undertakings within 
the same jurisdiction.326 State aid regulation aims to control the shape and availability of those 
national tools, which may usually have a strong and politically oriented economic reason behind 
them.327 Therefore, in the end, the question about amount of tax paid or unpaid by the company 
can be seen irrelevant in the core of the issue but, instead, whether treatment may be justified 
as legitimate practice in the light of equal treatment of all undertakings is more relevant.  
At the end of the day, it is indeed up to the Commission to control the new, existing and altered 
aid in accordance with the Article 108 TFEU. The system is based on ex ante -control, where 
Member States are liable to inform the Commission, which instead holds the power to 
investigate on its own initiative.328 This leaves room for discretion as the compatibility with the 
internal market lies in the exclusive competence of the Commission with the purpose in 
particular to enforce.329 Since CJEU has confirmed the principle of equal treatment in taxation, 
it would implicate that neither tax rulings can be excluded from the scope in this regard. Also, 
this argument can be brought to the same conversation with tax competition between countries 
and therefore being in line with the original aim. Ultimately, the assessment of compatibility of 
the state measure with the internal market is dependable on whether it is not violating the with 
fundamental principles and objectives of the EU, on which the evaluation is made by the 
Commission in accordance with the Article 108 TFEU.330 The General Court has confirmed 
that it is possible to argue against the application of transfer pricing in tax rulings on a coherent 
manner without fundamental changes in actual EU regulation and the Commission would most 
likely use it to the fullest of effect. As there are various instruments for intervening harmful 
conduct, the rules, related case law and their interpretation themselves are constantly molding 
and changing its nature to different directions.331 This is also a natural course of development 
of law as one measure, or certain application of rules, can be effectively utilized for some years 
until the other more effective measures in the light of fundamental objectives are being 
discovered.332  
As we are getting closer to Commission’s 2020 vision drafted in 2010 after financial crisis to 
generate ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, to find the path to create new jobs and to 
                                                 
326 Hancher – Sauter 2012, p. 262. 
327 See De Cecco 2012, p. 1; and Perez-Bernabeu 2017, p. 596. 
328 Poscic 2017, p. 494. 
329 Council Regulation 2015/1589 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 TFEU. 
330 See also Terra – Wartel 2008, p. 43. 
331 Sauter 2016, p. 222. 
332 Ibid. 
 
71 
offer a sense of direction to the societies’, competition law and state aid policy was seen as also 
contributing effectively and positively to the these objectives.333 It is reasonable to believe that 
promoting fiscal measures by intervening action that do not contribute to that objective via 
competition law would be step towards more innovative and effective internal market. 
Considering this objective, state aid regulation is a well-suited instrument in its attempt also to 
tackle aggressive tax planning of multinational companies in case the course of its actions 
would eventually be also accepted by the CJEU. Consequently, if there are no unanswered 
questions relating to competence at hand and the analysis can thus be proceeded with, it leaves 
us with two questions: (i) what should be shown and (ii) how and to what extent should it be 
evaluated by the court in order for a tax measure to violate the Article 107(1) TFEU? 
5.2 Burden of proof in the light of Court’s review 
As we understand how the Commission has gone this far in its analysis, we need to take a closer 
look to two concepts: The Commission need to show that the APA violates the Article 107(1) 
TFEU (burden of proof) and the Court needs to carry out a comprehensive review as to whether 
a measure falls within the scope of the treaty although the intensity of it may be speculated 
(intensity of review). The case as such usually includes two point of views with respect to the 
facts and circumstances – one by the Commission and by the Member State. In Olympiaki 
Aeroporia Ypiresies, it was held that the Commission is liable to, in principle, provide sufficient 
proof in its decision with respect to the existence of the aid.334 As sufficient is more or less 
vague term, this is anyhow logical conclusion as the Commission represent usually the 
challenging party. The Commission needs to perform ‘a diligent and impartial examination of 
the measures at issue’ in order to receive the most complete and reliable information possible 
in the case of incompatibility or unlawfulness of the aid.335 This is still somewhat general 
description on the amount of burden of proof to be conducted but, in practice, it is for the 
Commission to show that the conditions of Article 107 TFEU are sufficiently fulfilled. With 
respect to transfer pricing, the Commission must find the weak spots of the APA open to 
contesting with respect to transaction flows. This requires also fundamental expertise not only 
in competition law but also in transfer pricing and tax law.  
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In Fiat and Starbucks, the General Court held that even though the main rule for the Member 
State is that it has a margin of appreciation when approving the level of transfer pricing, that 
margin of appreciation must not nevertheless lead to the deprivation of Commission’s 
competence to test the accepted level of transfer pricing in case it would lead to the grant of a 
selective advantage pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU.336 Within the context of this competence, 
arm’s length principle and transfer pricing methodology are the key instruments for the 
Commission as it allows to verify (a) whether the level of transfer pricing accepted by national 
authorities in the APA may be deemed to correspond to a reliable approximation of a market-
based outcome and (b) whether any variation that may be identified in the course of that 
examination does not go beyond the inaccuracies inherent in the methodology used to obtain 
that approximation.337 
Despite these tools exist, the verification of being more accurate leaves a relative heavy burden 
of proof for the contesting analysis. Considering the nature of transfer pricing regarding 
‘acceptability’ of intra-group transactions, it is not uncommon in general that there may be a 
lot of discretion included in the evaluation as different instances or experts may have a different 
view even in the event of very similar circumstances of a certain undertaking. The reason behind 
the different conclusions could be e.g. due to application of different version of the OECD 
Guidelines, choice of a different method, several applied adjustments as well as completely 
different view on the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. As mentioned, not all of the 
transactions being compared and examined have equal degree of comparability. This means 
that there will be scenarios where applying even the most appropriate method would lead to 
range of different set of results that may be as equally reliable with each other.338 As the 
outcome may be different, assessment requires careful comparison between the data and values 
received. Typically, due to the existence and effect of multiple factors in the business activity 
of an undertaking, the received values represented in the arm’s length range are regarding 
possibly different market conditions as only one parameter corresponding with the exact arm’s 
length price would not be sufficient for this purpose.  
As a concrete example from the interpretation whether it is argued that the application of arm’s 
length level would be too low or high within the determined range – considering that even the 
range can be different due to the search criteria of the comparable companies – the mere fact 
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that a range includes different values indicates that different undertakings may or may not even 
be able to earn the desired amount of profits that is being compared. It flows from this example, 
that pricing either on the lower or higher end of the arm’s length range could not as such violate 
the arm’s length principle due to potential different factors behind the price setting.339 One 
needs to consider that set of possibly acceptable results may be obtained that could be easily 
led from the available financial information. The assessment of the suitable level is more of an 
analysis of complex contractual and economic situations for which OECD Guidelines offer an 
international framework for the assessment.340 Hence, conducting an thorough analysis of the 
application of transfer pricing related measures that can prove the existence that (a) APA 
contains a violation of arm’s length principle and (b) the transfer pricing assessment conducted 
by the Commission is more likely to correspond with normal market conditions is very difficult 
in case the tax ruling as such does not clearly contain the type of questionable application that 
could be easily challenged.341 The contesting analysis has thus indirectly questioned the motive 
and offered its alternative conclusion to the acceptable level of taxation. As it can be concluded 
from the decisions made by the Commission, strong position towards defending the functioning 
of the internal market and equal tax treatment of undertakings operating therein has been reason 
for this.  
The Court will eventually be in charge of evaluating this analysis made by the Commission. 
The Article 263 TFEU grants the Court with the power to review the legality of the acts adopted 
by the EU. But considering that the case involves a lot of technical aspects from transfer pricing 
view, the review process as such is not an easy task. According to the Court, in this case, ‘the 
analysis of the pleas in law raised in such an action has neither the object nor the effect of 
replacing a full investigation of the case in the context of an administrative procedure’.342 This 
means that the CJEU will not do the analysis of its own to resolve the case but will trust some 
of the facts and circumstances to the analysis of the Commission and the APA. This raises a 
question for the objectivity of review. However, the Court confirms that the state aid as a legal 
concept must be interpreted on the basis of objective factors. The Court nevertheless needs to 
go through the specific features of the case with respect to the technical or complex nature of 
the Commission’s assessments and then carry out a comprehensive review as to whether a 
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measure falls within the scope of Article 107(1).343 Nevertheless, the Court needs to only accept 
those limits that have already been discussed in the case and is unable to take a stand on any 
new grounds that have not been brought up by the interest parties. It is only giving the judgment 
to those pleas that have been listed so far.344 Professor Jose Luis da Cruz Vilaca however 
reminds that the difference between the concepts of margin of appreciation and duty to review 
may be to some extent blurry and that results to more difficult for the CJEU to remain consistent 
in its case law. 345  If the Court cannot objectively fully support the conclusion of the 
Commission, it would in this case dismiss such analysis and keep the content of APA 
compatible with the Article 107(1) TFEU. 
How intense should this then be? In Amazon and Fiat, the General court held that due to the 
approximate nature of transfer pricing, review is performed by verifying whether the advantage 
and errors identified by the Commission go beyond the inaccuracies inherent in the application 
of a method designed to obtain a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome.346 Since 
we are discussing relatively complex cases, it would be no wonder if the CJEU would be sitting 
in Grand Chamber.347 Also, as the intensity of review seem to be different depending on nature 
of the act, the Court need to be careful in order to maintain equal treatment and for both 
Commission and the Member State.348 For example, problems with the concept of equal tax 
treatment, especially when the determination of transfer prices are being associated with it, are 
nevertheless more or less ‘roughly right’ and open to interpretation. On the other hand, the same 
margin of discretion regarding APA by the national tax authorities for granting the aid needs to 
be considered as decisive element. 349  Such power may be a sign of selectivity as this 
presumption based on discretionary practices should be viewed as being crucial when 
discussing cases that relate to on ruling methods, transactions or other practices, which hold 
margin of discretion. Fundamental breach of arm’s length principle can be seen as an only 
conclusion that could lead to violation of state aid regulation. 
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For instance, CJEU has taken the view that departing from its normal guidelines by having 
discretion to adjust by the Member State, may put undertakings to unfair positions and thus 
regarded as a selective.350 To conclude, the burden of proof set for the Commission remains 
still ambiguous due to these aspects as eventually the General Court and CJEU need to accept 
the more reliable analysis. It is clear that the APA cannot be set aside without very heavy proof 
of poor application of OECD Guidelines. There are several fundamental aspects that affect the 
determination of the suitable level for the burden of proof and how it should be reviewed 
afterwards. The purpose of the arm’s length principle and the OECD Guidelines in general is 
to put the integrated companies to the similar position as non-integrated ones. Generally, it can 
be viewed that, also from the taxation point of view, in case the transactions between unrelated 
parties should be seen as a benchmark, the transfer pricing analysis includes ipso facto built-in 
mechanism for assessment of selectivity. The transfer prices are being benchmarked against the 
analysis and level that should correspond the market conditions, i.e. ‘normal system of 
reference’. The different treatment, however, does not arise from the domestic tax regulation as 
such – instead, it flows mostly from the actual business model of the undertaking. What is meant 
by business model is the overall transaction flows between different geographical locations 
within the same group. There is no de jury unequal treatment that can be found from the national 
legislation between undertakings belonging to a group and those that do not. In the assessment, 
the fundamental problem lies in how those preliminary designed transaction flows – that 
nevertheless need to comply with the arm’s length level – end up allocating the profit and 
expenses that have an impact on the level of tax burden.  
For a group of companies, it is neither prohibited to decide on how its business model will be 
put into effect. There is however no doubt that the functioning of the business model as such 
does consider the legislative and procedural changes in the business environment. In state aid 
context, in case arm’s length principle has been used to determine the taxable profit of a group 
company for corporate income tax purposes on the basis of a methodology that approximated 
market conditions, that company is not regarded to be treated favorably to non-integrated 
companies whose taxable profit is also determined by the market conditions.351 As made clear, 
APA is merely an instrument that seeks to bring stability to the tax environment of the 
undertaking by preliminary negotiating the treatment of certain transactions in corporate 
income taxation. In theory, the undertaking may alternatively price its intra-group transaction 
                                                 
350 C-241/94 French Republic v European Commission (1996), paragraphs 22 to 24. 
351 T‑760/15 and T‑636/16 the Netherlands v European Commission (2019), paragraph 140 and, T-755/15 and 
T-759/15 Luxembourg and Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe v European Commission (2019), paragraph 132. 
 
76 
flows at certain level even without the APA and from arm’s length point of view back it up by 
preparing a sufficient transfer pricing documentation for potential tax audits. Therefore, in the 
absence of APA – but taking the other facts and circumstances for the undertaking’s business 
or tax operating model as permanent and existent – would these tax arrangements have been 
caught by the state aid regulation? Not necessarily since the state measure would be more 
difficult to define even though the situation would be de facto the same. Considering that the 
national tax authorities would have accepted the similar tax treatment also through APA, 
against this fact pattern there would necessarily be no intervention afterwards either.352  
The purpose of the example above is to demonstrate the difficulty of indication of material 
selectivity if it through certain level of transfer prices ends up allegedly treating different 
undertakings by different means.353 As the transfer pricing regulation is irrelevant for the non-
integrated undertakings, more emphasize could be given to the preliminary discussions with 
tax authorities or actual access to the ruling instead of transfer prices as such. This makes the 
comparison basically impossible as the ruling includes, again, transfer pricing regulation. Due 
to this incoherence and discrepancy, as whether the non-integrated undertakings have the 
similar access to tax rulings, the Commission may have intentionally focused more on the 
criterion of advantage instead of that of selectivity. Therefore, no in-depth analysis as such was 
needed to make by the Commission on the fact why integrated undertakings should be 
considered in a comparable factual and legal situation to non-integrated undertakings but only 
put reasonable effort on arguing that APA was incompatible with the arm’s length principle 
providing advantage to its holder.354  
The Court has a difficult task of balancing between the two – possibly also very well-reasoned 
– alternatives for correct application of transfer prices. However, the Court needs to also take 
the Member States position and its margin of appreciation into account as this relates heavily 
on legal certainty for the undertaking’s point of view. Therefore, the only conclusion that can 
be drawn from this is that the actual task for the Court is to consider whether there is so 
substantial and fundamental deviation from the market conditions that it cannot at any level be 
seen to be compatible with the correct application of OECD Guidelines. This means also that 
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the burden of proof needs to be set high for the Commission and the Court needs to have a 
certain level of understanding of transfer pricing. 
5.3 Importance of legal certainty 
As said, even though there would be a high burden of proof set for the Commission, the actions 
were not foreseeable and take a retrospective effect and they can be seen incompatible with the 
principle of legal certainty. In Falck y A. di Bolzano, the CJEU stated that the principle of legal 
certainty prevents the Commission from indefinitely delaying the exercise of its powers.355 The 
Commission as well as the Courts need to base their analysis merely on information that was 
not available or reasonably foreseeable when the APA was concluded.356  
From companies’ perspective, the lack of clarity when it comes to application of APAs in state 
aid context can be deemed to be not only harmful as the certain level of predictability in taxation 
is generally very crucial for undertakings as they need to be aware of whether they should be a 
party to tax ruling without getting in trouble in the future.357 This approach endanger the use of 
APAs as an instrument of preliminary agreement in case it could nevertheless be challenged 
based not on any irrelevant information arising outside of the application of arm’s length 
principle but on the actual facts included and agreed by the tax payer and tax authorities in the 
APA. However, from EU state aid point of view, the Commission defends its actions based on 
that the measure has been granted without notification, and therefore a delay by the Commission 
in ordering recovery does not suffice to render that recovery decision as unlawful under the 
legal certainty principle.358 There have in any case been legal grounds for the investigations. 
On the other hand, the American Chamber of Commerce raised concern that the move towards 
an arm’s length principle based on Article 107(1) TFEU with undetermined scope is not 
providing sufficient guidance for the companies whether they are able or should comply with 
it considering that it is systematically independent from the transfer pricing principles under 
the OECD Guidelines and with national tax legislations of the Member States.359 Considering 
the importance of transfer pricing for a MNE as well as the OECD Guidelines’ application, 
unclear guidance within the application of transfer prices for sure creates irrelevant uncertainty 
on how the setting of acceptable standard. Indeed, there is clearly a need for further clarification 
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for tax rulings and their correct application. EU – the Commission in this case – should take 
more initiatives towards communication between different interest parties and Member States 
with regard to APAs, transfer pricing and their applicability and compatibility with the 
competition regulation.  
Also, one important question that is raised in the legal literature is the ultimate result of the 
current approach. Dimitrios Kyriazis argues that not only having an effect on undertakings 
possible tax burden with respect to retroactive aspect, the legal uncertainty may in worst case 
mean that Commission’s department of competition may face problems with its efficiency if 
the approach and application of arm’s length principle therein will not be clarified.360 There is 
a risk of being overwhelmed with notifications from different Member States with regard to 
correct application of tax rulings, something that the Commission may struggle with to assess 
in coherent manner.361 Also, according to some critics, as the Commission’s notion of aid as 
well as Working Paper on Tax Rulings have not been drafted to be precisely clear in this sense 
with regard to correct application of arm’s length principle in the context of the EU state aid 
law, it would be very much useful for the Commission to provide the Member States and tax 
payers with guidance on the framework of such application that are most likely to be caught by 
the Article 107(1) TFEU.362 These concerns are all very true.  
Could this type of argumentation be turned also upside down? In other words, the approach 
taken by the Commission is providing more legal certainty by taking clear steps by 
implementing the arm’s length principle as a primary source to assess the acceptability of 
certain tax measure within the Member State. Should this approach be eventually accepted by 
the CJEU, it is clear after that the arm’s length principle per se would be part of the very core 
of assessment with tax rulings and would then affect the Member State measures as well. After 
all, if the issue was to be considered in the light of legal certainty, who would need to be blamed 
for? The actions have taken place due to measures by the Member States and, therefore, had 
the Member States regarded the state aid context already while applying transfer pricing 
methods and drafting the APA, this would probably encourage to more comprehensive and 
detailed tax rulings with the tax payer. This is however very theory-orientated. It does neither 
remove the fact that the Commission could in principle still consider the existence of violation. 
Therefore, it is clear that more guidance and dialogue between the Commission, Member States 
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and tax payers is welcome. It would make the assessment procedure more clear in case the 
evaluation of transfer prices, considering that the arm’s length principle is a part of the EU 
principles, would be purely based on OECD Guidelines without any mention that the 
Commission is not formally bound by OECD Guidelines.363 This may not only be regarded as 
‘cherry-picking’ from the Commission point of view but also heavily increases the amount of 
less needed uncertainty. However, EU based arm’s length principle would still be a separate 
principle from the equivalent in domestic legislation. 
If legal certainty is under threat, is it because the Member State presumed that APAs could not 
be caught under Article 107(1) TFEU as direct taxation is out of scope of application for the 
Commission? In Fiat, Luxembourg claimed that that the Commission had gone beyond its 
competence and thus infringed both Articles 4 and 5 TEU, which draw the distinction between 
the competences of Member States and the EU, that could be characterized as ‘tax 
harmonization in disguise’ even though direct taxation is within the sole and exclusive 
competence of the Member States as stated in Article 114 TFEU.364 This type of argumentation 
tries to hint towards an approach that the Commission would try to established itself as some 
sort of an appeal instance of national tax authorities as it is reviewing whether the tax ruling in 
question was unordinary in the light of both national law and the OECD regulation. This is also 
one of the concerns, which is also indirectly raised by the US Treasury in its criticism, that the 
purpose of the decisions is merely to achieve tax harmonization via the back door as, according 
to the critics, this is the mere practical consequence of this legal effect of newly adopted EU 
law principle in taxation matters. 365 However, the competence in taxation is not solely for the 
Member States. 
From the legitimacy side, the problem with the new adoption of arm’s length principle as new 
EU law principle being part of the equal treatment in taxation could be that this also has an 
effect on the fiscal sovereignty of the Member States, considering that in the case of application 
of national law, it may need to put aside and replace them with the supremacy of the EU law 
principle irrespective from the fact that the regulation has not been set by the national 
parliament but due to the effect of State aid regulation.366 The issue is however tricky as 
basically all of the state aid measures in this context are being viewed as part of the EU 
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competition rules as listed in the treaties, meaning that they directly fall within the scope of 
exclusive competence of the EU and taxation is no difference in this regard.367 This makes also 
the definition of limits in the field of intervening the national competence difficult to define. 
Therefore, the notion of selectivity requires careful assessment as noted by the AG considering 
that all the other criteria listed in the Article 107(1) TFEU are almost always easily being 
fulfilled.368 
“Too broad an understanding of the selectivity of national provisions, however, 
harbors the risk of adversely affecting the division of competences between the 
Member States and the European Union, laid down in Articles 2 to 6 TFEU, and the 
division of internal competences between the EP and the Council, laid down in 
Article 14 TFEU, on the one hand, and the Commission, laid down in Article 17 
TFEU, on the other. For, where there is State aid within the meaning of Article 
107(1) TFEU, the Commission usually has broad discretion under Article 107(3) 
TFEU to determine whether and under what circumstances it will or will not endorse 
the political decisions taken in the Member States, even though it has no powers of 
its own under the Treaties to legislate in the policy areas concerned.”369 
The Commission does not see this as a breach of sovereignty as the approach, which eventually 
was confirmed by the General Court as well, is that the arm’s length principle in the application 
of Article 107(1) TFEU would be irrelevant from the fact how the same principle is or is not 
taken into account in the tax practice of that particular Member State. Considering the related 
case-law, even though direct taxation is in the Member States’ own competence, they need 
anyway to exercise competence in accordance with EU law.370 This principle would set the 
fundamental basis for the Commission to review the direct taxation related measures. The 
Commission cannot be seen as a tax-appeal instance in this regard but merely monitoring the 
compliance with Article 107 TFEU in case the tax measure in questions happens to be favoring 
certain undertakings. According to General Court, it flows from here that even though the 
Commission does not at this point of the development and harmonization of EU law possess 
the competence to define the framework of normal taxation without taking into account the 
national tax rules, however whether an advantage actually exists needs be determined by 
reference thereto and a tax measure, which affects the tax base that is taken into account by the 
tax authorities may come within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.371 This indirect way of 
assessing the tax measure of the Member State could be concluded as that it is not participating 
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in any tax harmonization but rather exercising its competition law related power in the light of 
Article 107(1) TFEU.  
This was already set out in Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL, where the tax payer failed to point 
out that competence in tax matters relies duly in the hands of the Member States. With regard 
to transfer pricing, also in Starbucks, the Commission recalled that it is merely evaluating if the 
tax authorities conferred any selective advantage by concluding an APA that makes allocation 
of profit possible, which is different from that amount of profit that would have been normally 
taxed for other undertakings at arm’s length.372 This type of approach definitely grants the 
Commission with a lot of decision-making power when it comes to evaluation of the correct 
application. It could be construed that the Commission indirectly tries to describe how the 
amount of taxable profit should be considered by the domestic tax authorities for avoiding any 
conflicts with EU state aid regulations. Thus, a separate arm’s length principle within the 
Article 107(1) TFEU independent from national legislation may be seen as an attempt towards 
harmonization of direct taxation within the internal market.373  
This results to a situation that the Commission would perform a similar evaluation that tax 
authorities would in normal circumstances perform resembling more or less tax audit, which in 
the end result to a transfer pricing adjustment proposal. As this is however not a tax audit, there 
is still a clear distance between tax harmonization and equal competition. In Amazon, 
Luxembourg argued that the Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation) and the OECD Forum 
on Harmful Tax Practices had made it clear that tax ruling practice in the country is consistent 
with the OECD Code of Conduct and the OECD Guidelines.374 However, the Commission 
reminds that the objective of those are different from state aid regulation that aim to address 
distortions of competition resulting from favorable treatment by Member States instead of 
tackling harmful tax competition. 375 Distinction between the actual objectives and, therefore, 
competences must be drawn and they need to be made clear for all the parties involved. 
5.4 Aftermath and further developments 
Finally, the above has explained that (i) the Commission need to provide sufficient proof 
trumping the original application in the APA and (ii) the Court needs to accept this only if there 
is a substantial difference to market conditions. The review must be conducted in favor of the 
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Member State if it is not a fundamental breach of arm’s length principle. However, after 
Starbucks judgment was given by the General Court, Government of the Netherlands, the party 
to the judgment, published a statement regarding the much-pursued clarity with respect to the 
case.  
Even though the General Court ruled in favor of the Dutch government and the government 
was of the opinion that potentially prohibited state aid and tax avoidance can be intervened by 
the Commission by examining the tax treatment of individual undertakings as part of the 
investigations, it still argued that the Commission had based its ruling under non-existent arm’s 
length principle in EU law and argued that the evaluation should be done purely based on the 
national law and therefore on the OECD guidelines.376 There might have also been a lot of 
public pressure and external influences for the Commission to try to tighten the coherent tax 
system in the European but the Commission approach has also faced a lot of criticism.377 The 
criticism from the Netherlands is a good example of the dilemma as the current approach taken 
by the Commission will in any case create two separate concepts of arm’s length principle. 
In general, most of the critic relates wrongly taken interventions on potential distortions of 
competition due to the completely legally adopted direct taxation policies within Member 
States. Instead of tax harmonization to combat tax planning – which may be seen practically 
impossible objective due to its politically loaded nature – it would be easier to achieve these 
objectives through competition law. Thus, through the established case law, the Commission 
has taken the stand to use State aid regulation in order to achieve its legitimate policy objectives, 
inter alia to tackle harmful tax competition in the internal market.378 As many of the US based 
companies have been targeted by this new approach developed by the Commission, the USS 
Treasury has been quite active and rather direct in its feedback in exchanges of letters between 
DG competition of the Commission and its white paper concerning the recent State aid 
actions.379 Considering the international nature of transfer pricing assessment, the transatlantic 
opinion and criticism can be also taken into account when evaluating the actions of the 
Commission.  
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The US Treasury criticized the Commission for the approach as it in its view, among other 
excuses, differs from the prior EU case law and Commission’s decisions when it comes to 
evaluation of the concepts of “advantage” and “selectivity” separately from each other.380 In 
the recent decision-making. selective advantage has been the way to assess instead of 
independently assessing whether an advantage and the selective nature of the aid exist in 
comparison to prior case law.381 Although, the Commission has clearly stated that is not bound 
by its previous decisional-practice and, thus, each potential aid measure needs to be evaluated 
based on its own facts and circumstances under the objective criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU.382 
Therefore, even if hypothetically a contrary decisional practice could be shown to exist, in 
Commission’s view that does not have an effect to the findings of the decision in question. May 
the critical voices then be deemed as purely non-legal? They are for sure more political debate 
than legal opinions. For example, former Head of the State Aid Department of the Irish Ministry 
of Economy Eugene Stuart argued that Apple most of all relates to Ireland's political interest to 
defend its tax sovereignty, investments to their country especially by the US based MNEs and 
employment policy. against the EU regulation and, at the same time, the US authorities’ see the 
approach to discriminate its MNEs operating their businesses in Europe.383 
Moreover, in Apple, the interested parties being heard and the joint letter signed by several trade 
associations are, particularly, concerned that the initiatives under EU state aid regulation would 
undermine legal certainty and do not tackle harmful tax competition practices as well as under 
OECD or other policy channels.384 Additionally, assuming that the Commission and the Courts 
would eventually conclude that APAs would constitute incompatible measures in the internal 
market, recovery of the aid should nevertheless be excluded based on the principle of legitimate 
expectations. According to Ireland, the conclusion in this regard is correct as it points out that 
a reasonable and diligent taxpayer could not have foreseen the Commission’s prima facie 
finding of incompatible State aid at the time of concluding the APA.385 Fedil, in Amazon, adds 
that that the Commission is taking the view in its decision-making that there would be only a 
single truth in transfer pricing related assessment, which makes it impossible for companies to 
obtain preliminary legal certainty.386 
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It is safe to say that the interested parties have vested interest on the outcome of the taken 
measures and the criticism cannot be viewed as completely objective. However, Professor 
Jérôme Monsenego raises few arguments that may be open to argumentation later in front of 
CJEU. First, since the related and unrelated parties were seen in a factual and legal comparable 
situation, the General Court did not investigate the determination of reference system and this 
conclusion in-depth but merely accepted the argumentation of the Commission in its 
decision. 387  Second, as the Commission confirms that the arm’s length principle is of 
approximate nature, meaning that even the notion of range due to its non-exact characteristics 
should be accepted and the received notion of range cannot just be dismissed under the State 
aid rules and claim that only a certain value within that range would correspond with the real 
market conditions as a deviation constituting the illegal State aid. 388 Above all, coming back to 
legal certainty as well as determination of the reference system as well as its interpretation, the 
General Court nevertheless leaves it open in its judgment how to determine this type of arm’s 
length level correctly or apply transfer pricing method to obtain reliable approximation of 
market-based outcome in a compliant way with EU state aid policy.389  
5.5 Direction of the regulation 
A lot of advocates for the Commission actions in the field of state aid practice are favoring even 
more use of EU state aid law to prevent tax planning in the internal market as well as tax base 
erosion of the Member States as it can be seen as an effective tool also to prevent harmful tax 
distortion and double non-taxation.390 It must be borne in mind that the purpose of state aid 
control is not related to the external but to the internal uniformity of tax systems, as said, ‘pure 
tax competition’ Member States or in other words discrepancies between the different tax 
systems are excluded from the scope of application.391 By double non-taxation it is meant that 
the undertaking and its intra-group transactions is not being allocated to either country related 
to the transaction. Double non-taxation does not regard to tax system of one state but exists due 
to that their domestic tax legislations communicate with each other in different ways, e.g. 
because of double-taxation treaties or provisions of national legislation and exists merely in the 
absence of sort of harmonization. Double non-taxation for an undertaking may just take place 
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due to application of domestic tax regulation is correctly conducted by the Member State 
despite of the fact that aggressive tax planning could be prevented by state aid regulation.392  
The issue of tax harmonization on the other hand has been on the agenda of BEPS as well as 
EU. Should double non-taxation of an undertaking take place because of the actions of Member 
State, for example in APA, these measures are caught by the Article 107(1) TFEU although it 
requires the existence of unequal treatment of similarly placed undertakings by the Member 
State. Although the Commission is accused of seeing the state aid law as a backdoor to intervene 
the direct taxation, regulation is purely assessing the compatibility with the conditions of Article 
107(1) TFEU and may be deemed to be too little when it comes to tackling harmful practices 
with regard to tax planning.393 After all, there is simply no competence to interfere with the 
external differences of the Member States that may even lead to non-double taxation of the 
companies. The European Parliament has stated that such mismatches are not in the scope of 
state aid regulation and could only be caught if (a) the tax authorities have confirmed that an 
intra-group transaction in the tax ruling, but it is in violation of the normal interpretation of 
domestic tax law or (b) special legislation in the Member State creates the mismatch that only 
applies to certain companies on a selective basis.394 All in all, since direct corporate taxation 
lies on the sovereignty of the Member States, the application and comprehensive tax related 
assessment in the light of Article 107(1) TFEU remains complex and the Commission is obliged 
to find the correct balance with regard to economic, political and legal point of view. 
As explained the difficulties related to the topic, it is no wonder that the amount of other options 
for the Commission can be deemed low but not nonexistent. Even though providing of guidance 
and regulative framework related to prevention of aggressive tax planning is one element for 
the Commission to fight against tax evasion and tax fraud, lack of harmonization for actual 
taxation eventually still prevents any heavy interventions. Therefore, state aid regulation is 
ultimately an effective tool in comparison to other measures. However, from all the other 
possible alternatives, not taking the consolidation of direct taxation and tax bases in the EU into 
account as these can be regarded fully hypothetical in the current situation, what would be the 
best way to proceed and needed in order to achieve fair tax competition in the EU? There should 
                                                 
392 Gonzalez 2016, p. 573. 
393 Ibid. 
394 EU State Aid Law And National Tax Rulings, p. 15. 
 
86 
at least be other measures increasing legal certainty in the internal market, e.g. more 
transparency for corporate taxation regulation and information being exchanged.395  
In the end, the harmonization efforts by interpreting state aid regulation and having a broad 
concept for construing selectiveness and advantage may still face problems during the 
assessment of the CJEU. This relates to amount of advantage granted by an individual tax ruling 
by the Member State or other ambiguously analyzed points related to transfer pricing within 
the cases that may take a lot of time to resolve. This however may just generate more 
unnecessary uncertainty among undertakings if the related Member States and undertakings 
need to wait for the judgment. The current position applied with respect to recovery of tax after 
prohibited aid could be critically reviewed too.396 It has been suggested that the Commission 
could improve its state aid policy to operate more effectively in case, by regulatory means, 
competitors that have suffered loss due to the existence of prohibited aid measure would be 
able to sue the particular Member State for compensation under judgment in Francovich.397 
This would make a lot of sense and would immediately create an economic deterrent for 
Member State to lose their tax revenue to other Member States. However, this would require 
certain additions and changes in regulation, where there is no guarantee of acceptance from the 
Member States. 
The Commission has in long-term concentrated in its actions to increase the effective impact 
of state aid regulation, i.e. it has been more strict with the criteria regarding when are Member 
States able to issue aid measures and, additionally, imposed the obligation to thoroughly 
evaluate the actual effect of any granted subsidies while trying to pursue their public policy 
objectives.398 Some have even argued that when considering from the administrative point of 
view, the cases underlined are largely important for the status of the Commission as the ultimate 
regulator in the context of EU state aid. This is because the actions taken by the Commission 
are trying to simplify the related workload and making a clear shift from investigation so called 
bulk of state aid notifications to bigger cases with more significance and money on the table.399 
Nonetheless, behind every investigation there is a huge workload with many experts involved, 
which also is probably an attempt to underline the seriousness and effectiveness of state aid 
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regulation. All this in the end speaks for a communication and preliminary discussions between 
Member States and the Commission as much as possible.  
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6. Conclusions 
6.1 Summary of the main findings 
The tax rulings are not prohibited, merely the practical effect as putting different undertakings 
to unequal position in comparison to similarly determined undertakings and thus they may be 
critically reviewed in state aid context. The message that is sent by the Commission to the 
Member States is that state aid aspects should be equally considered while negotiating and 
applying the arm’s length principle in the APAs with tax payers in their jurisdictions. In 
Commission’s opinion, the tax rulings can violate the EU state aid regulation and fulfill the 
required four conditions to be captured by the Article 107(1) TFEU. However, the Commission 
still needs to carefully provide sufficient proof and analyze (i) whether there was a fundamental 
breach of arm’s length principle and (ii), in order to show this, conclude a more diligent transfer 
pricing analysis in comparison to the APA to eventually put a stop on harmful tax arrangements 
in the internal market. The Commission has chosen to take the path of intervening the tax 
planning of MNEs within the EU by pursuing the state of equal treatment in the EU, an approach 
that is criticized and considered by the opponents as a try to harmonize direct taxation through 
Article 107(1) TFEU regardless of fiscal autonomy of the Member State. The accusations of 
harmonization can however be argued against. Fundamental breach refers to a situation where 
the application and use of transfer pricing methodology is substantially incompatible with the 
OECD Guidelines. 
General Court has eventually confirmed the Commission’s approach that involves the arm’s 
length principle being part of the Article 107(1) TFEU to assess whether certain tax 
arrangements or rulings violate the EU state aid regulation. By doing this, it is possible for the 
Commission to catch practices in the field of cross-border taxation without directly getting 
involved in breaching the tax competence of Member State, irrelevant from the implementation 
measures or whether the principle has been followed by the standards of the national tax 
legislation. The Court shall nonetheless accept no other than substantial and fundamental errors 
conducted in the APA and review the case as objectively as possible, in other words, not giving 
too much weight on Commission’s analysis over content of APA. Therefore, as long as the 
Commission is able to reasonably perform a thorough transfer pricing analysis with respect to 
facts and circumstances of the case and indicate fundamental differences in the level transfer 
prices in comparison to the APA and normal rules of taxation in that particular Member State, 
the interference may be justified for maintaining equal treatment of undertakings in taxation. It 
will thus violate the EU state aid rules by providing the APA holder with selective advantage. 
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Insofar as the General Court judgments can be concerned, arm’s length principle as pointed by 
the Commission is a tool to assess in case the preliminary agreed level of taxable profit of an 
undertaking. The Commission may trust its assessment on identifying the existence of an 
advantage in the case of outcome that can be deemed more than only being inaccurate and that 
normally are generating in the transfer pricing methodology used to obtain a reliable 
approximation.400 This means that the burden of proof is high considering that there number of 
normal outcomes in transfer pricing methodology as pointed out in this research. 
Even though the arm’s length principle could be inherent as a part of Article 107(1) TFEU, the 
fundamental basis can ultimately be traced back to OECD Guidelines. However, the status of 
arm’s length principle forming a part of Commission’s assessment as such has an undefined 
meaning as no clear guidance is given as despite of the reasoning being based heavily on OECD 
Guidelines, the arm’s length principle was still deemed to be independent principle in the EU. 
Also, even if the direct taxation falls within the competence of the Member States, they must 
exercise their competence consistently with EU law.401 This interpretation makes the arm’s 
length principle basically equivalent to hard law instead of being mere OECD soft law 
instrument. Therefore, with respect to existing law, arm’s length principle can be characterized 
as an independent principle under EU law as the tool eventually creating the extent of 
derogation from the normal market conditions. 
Even the established system of reference can be argued to be too broad pointing out the 
legislative differences between related and non-related group of companies. This research has 
pointed the huge impact it has on the actual reasoning throughout the case. Also in this case, 
the Commission is always under obligation to provide proof on existence of the aid and, in this 
regard, must conduct a diligent and impartial examination of the measures in accordance with 
the most complete and reliable information possible available. This requirement on the 
complete information always speaks out for the use of OECD Guidelines as it is – in the words 
of General Court – based on important work carried out by groups of renowned experts.402 Even 
if Member State has had margin of appreciation when approving transfer pricing methodology 
in the APA, it is possible for the Commission to verify that the transfer pricing in question does 
not lead to the grant of a selective advantage. However, the verification process is not as easy 
as it sounds since the transfer pricing assessment does not lead to an exact result, merely to an 
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approximation. Hence, the burden of proof and the determination of the limit for thorough 
analysis for the Commission is of importance question. It must be concluded that it is the 
analysis by the Commission trumping the APA if the Court reviews it as a fundamental breach 
of arm’s length principle. No minor differences in application of transfer pricing methods 
however should constitute a violation of Article 107(1) TFEU. Again, for all parties, most likely 
that the argumentation based on the most relevant international taxation and transfer pricing 
sources, especially OECD Guidelines, will guarantee the best success in the case.  
The eventual consequence of such outcome is that this may have an effect on the mixing of 
facts and circumstances as understood by the Member States and undertakings in comparison 
to that of the Commission. As always in transfer pricing related argumentation, 
recharacterization of one’s business model can face many difficulties on the way. Hopefully, 
the research has managed to underline the difficulty of the analysis as being always based on 
comparison of two different views on the same fact pattern by applying the same source of law 
with the different application – to top it all with the fact that political, ideological or economic 
reasons affect on the background of the process. Thus, as no clear guidance is yet available, the 
definition of an acceptable tax arrangement with respect to state aid policy remains difficult to 
define. This, on the other hand, may cause harm to the usefulness and predictableness of tax 
rulings, and therefore the first judgment by the CJEU is looked forward to great extent. 
Therefore, the Court must take only relevant technical aspects into account and set the burden 
of proof high for the analysis of the Commission.  
6.2 Concluding remarks 
Even though the end results for the Commission in Starbucks and Fiat were both in favor and 
against the preliminary decisions of the Commission, the General Court can be seen to be very 
much supportive regarding the structure of the challenging argumentation related to transfer 
pricing in Commission’s investigations, especially to that extent when the applicability of the 
arm's length principle has been assessed as if it could constitute a selective advantage to an 
undertaking belonging to a group. Nether the connection of arm’s length principle to Article 
107(1) TFEU being dismissed by the CJEU nor the potential outcomes of establishing another 
system of reference than the entire national tax law that would in principle allow different 
treatment of integrated and non-integrated companies have not been deeply analyzed in this 
report. One could make a conclusion that the successful measures so far have impacted the 
currently ongoing investigations by the Commission with respect to similar tax rulings that have 
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been granted by the Netherlands to Ikea and Nike as well as by Luxembourg to Huhtamaki.403 
The judgment in Starbucks however pointed out that even if this chosen approach was deemed 
acceptable to intervene, it is not guaranteed for the Commission that the General Court or CJEU 
would always accept their point of view in case the analysis cannot sufficiently be deemed as 
diligent and impartial examination. As the CEO of Apple Tim Cook called these measures 
against Ireland as ‘total political crap’, it must be noted that this battle, from the tax payers and 
Member States’ perspective, has therefore not completely been lost in ongoing and future cases 
since, in every case, the proof in Commission’s reasoning must overrule the content of APA in 
order to show potential existence of the state aid.404 As the capturing of general aid schemes 
could be in author’s opinion more easily to justified as violating the Article 107(1) TFEU for 
putting different operators to different position de jure, individual tax rulings are nonetheless 
based on the application of transfer pricing methodology, which is very much depending on the 
margin of discretion allowed for the national authorities and does not necessarily aim to put 
companies to unequal position even if the outcome may result to de facto selective treatment 
for the company.  
The debate on whether this approach is merely an indirect way for which the EU state aid 
regulations have not been intended and whether the objectives of State aid rules have been 
breached are most likely to continue between different interest parties so far as the first 
judgment from CJEU will be received. It can also be said without a doubt that the decisions by 
the Commission and General Court’s judgments have already had an impact on the behavior of 
MNEs and that the state aid aspects will be considered in the future. More guidance is however 
definitely required for the Member States as well as for the companies to secure establishment 
of uniform and reliable framework to operate in. Fairly applicable rules and prevention of 
aggressive tax planning are important objectives notably in the functioning of the internal 
market to which the Commission needs to pursue.  
In short-term, even though the material meaning and application of arm’s length principle in 
state aid context may be challenged, it is crucial that, in the long-term, the legal certainty and 
information should be created to avoid discussions of legitimate objectives of EU institutions 
in creation of equal playing field. After the first final judgment by the CJEU is available, further 
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analysis should be conducted, for example, on how the legal questions regarding arm’s length 
principle as a tool in state aid context as discussed in this research have been dealt with. The 
upcoming years will show, additionally, how state aid regulation and its application will fit into 
taxation measures in modern information society and to its changes where more and more 
business activities, value creation and profit-making are purely based on the internet making 
the allocation of profit becomes more and more difficult. After all, in the current integrated EU, 
no measure can be analyzed as purely national in nature, meaning the taxation, despite of 
national sovereignty, is already connected to this development. The Commission and its state 
aid policy will also need to be able to react and adapt to this new environment to face these 
challenges in the future. 
